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Secretary Paulson Proposes Something New: The First National Bad Bank of the United States

Good-bye To All That: The End of Free Markets


Today is Day 6 of the “New Trade”: the death and rebirth of the financial system as we know it. Every single day this week has brought things that no one working today has ever seen before. Yesterday was no exception

It was a day of unprecedented volatility in the credit and money markets. The prices of short-duration Treasury securities traversed ranges that are usually seen across entire interest-rate cycles. In a single day.

The stock market, which started the day about 900 points below its level of a mere week ago and kept falling, suddenly turned euphoric and rocketed about 600 points from the low that it reached at 1pm EDT.

What happened to change the mood? Henry Paulson announced that he and Ben Bernanke are planning to construct a government entity that will take ownership of much of the “bad paper,” or distressed securities, from Wall Street.

In essence, they’re planning to save the free market system by killing it.

It was just what battered, exhausted, shell-shocked and weary traders wanted to hear.

Let me tell you a few things about it…


Henry Paulson is the lame-duck Treasury Secretary whose final three months in office will permanently change the world we all live in. What did he do this time?

Along with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, Paulson is hammering out a multipart proposal that would create a government-owned entity to acquire large amounts of the distressed mortgage-backed securities that are currently poisoning the balance sheets of banks, Wall St. firms, and others.

The entity, a “bad bank,” would possibly be structured something like a hedge fund, or like the $30 billion vehicle that the Fed created to hold MBS taken out of Bear Stearns.

There is also a proposal to step up the Treasury’s direct purchases of MBS in the open market. (This is actually an acceleration of one of the features of the Fannie/Freddie takeover.)

But it’s the first thing, the new national “bad bank,” that we have to understand and concentrate on.

Paulson spent the evening on Capitol Hill, briefing key lawmakers and staffers about the proposal, which won’t appear in draft form until early next week. It will probably require emergency legislation.

Congress will either vote on the proposal before they get out of Dodge on September 26 to go face the voters, or else they’ll give Paulson permission to do his worst while they’re out of town. The possibility of coming back to DC for an emergency session after Congress adjourns was also raised.

Paulson and Bernanke need to get two critical things right about the new “First National Bad Bank of the United States”: the price and the covenants. And there are powerful opposing reasons to go one direction or another on these.

If they’re proposing to go to Wall Street and everyone else in the shadow banking system, and put down a bid for their mortgage-backed securities, what will the price be?

There is no liquid secondary market for MBS. Like the vast majority of debt securities other than US Treasuries, people bought them with the intention of holding them to maturity, not to trade them. So there’s no reliable market price. No one honestly knows what many MBS are actually worth. If you define current market value as whatever someone is willing to pay today, then the answer is effectively zero, which obviously is far too low.

The First National Bad Bank of the US can’t offer to buy MBS at par, or face value. These securities have already declined in value because of the increase in the rate of home mortgage defaults. The people who originally bought the paper must take losses. Otherwise the Treasury is rewarding everyone for making a horrible investment decision. This would create enough moral hazard to swamp the entire financial system.

On the other hand, they can’t force everyone to take a huge haircut. Depending on how big a loss you force people to take, it could impair everyone’s capital for years to come. And that doesn’t fix the credit crunch.

The answer is somewhere in the middle. Let’s be extremely clear about this point:

The role of the First National Bad Bank of the US is to set a price in the MBS market. The government is going to do what the market was unable to do, which is to value these highly-illiquid securities and make them tradable again.

We always say that markets are good at setting prices because they process information so efficiently. This is a case where there is no information to process, so there’s no market, and the government will have to set a price using a completely unconventional method.

They’ll construct elaborate computerized valuation models, incorporating inputs from historical prices and from stochastic analysis. That will take a lot of time and computer cycles. At the end of that process, someone will stick his finger in his mouth, hold it up to the breeze, and write down the first number that pops into his head. That will be the price.

And whether that price turns out to be correct will determine whether the credit crisis will end, or whether we get a massive asset deflation that would trigger a crash in the real economy, with reduced output, job losses, and all the rest.

Not too much pressure, is it? Paulson can handle it.

In economic terms, the effect of this is to reflate the economy. The system is in distress because of the capital losses on MBS. There is no current market for MBS, so their value is effectively zero. But the First National Bad Bank will artificially create a value that is far above zero.

This is precisely identical to increasing the size of the money supply by printing new money. It’s inflation. The Treasury has said that they expect to finance the Bad Bank’s purchases of MBS by issuing new Treasury debt. Maybe half a trillion dollars’ worth of new debt.

There’s no way to sugarcoat this. It’s as if you went to the track and you lost money, and your rich uncle gave you an amount of Monopoly money equal to what you lost. (Minus a discount, just to teach you a lesson.) Except that the Monopoly money can buy stuff just like real money can.

This is where the covenants come in. The government is providing something of value to the people it will buy MBS from. What will it take from them in return? I don’t know the answer to that question.

Maybe they will be forced to fund the purchases themselves at some penalty rate of interest. Maybe they will be forced to submit to onerous regulatory restrictions on their future behavior. This is a big question mark that Paulson et al will need to fill in over the next few days. They certainly can’t get this for free.

Now what happens to the First National Bad Bank? Well, how long does an MBS last? Usually about five to seven years. That’s how long it will take for the Bad Bank’s portfolio to run off. As the paper matures, the Bad Bank will automatically self-liquidate.

Remember I said earlier that your lenders won’t allow you to hold positions on which you’ve had capital losses? That’s not a problem for the Bad Bank. They will be able to hold the distressed portfolio to maturity.

That’s the essence of why the Bad Bank is a good idea. It’s basically paying off the financial system’s margin call, so everyone can get back to lending money for business again.

What would the risk be? Well, if the Bad Bank pays too much for the portfolio, we risk a massive and destructive inflation. That’s a real danger.

And if they underpay? Well, then we’d risk a deflation, which would be vastly more destructive. (It would be Great Depression II.) They will err on the side of overpaying.

There are two key side effects of overvaluing the systemic MBS portfolio. One is inflation, which we will certainly get. We know that going in. Inflation, interestingly enough, is a cost that can be largely defeased by handing it off to the rest of the world, which has shown almost no diminution of its desire to hold our paper.

The other side effect is moral hazard.

And the only way to control moral hazard that is created by government, is for government to control the subsequent behavior of the beneficiaries.

We will see in the next few years a pulse of financial and economic re-regulation that will be as large as the New Deal. Possibly even larger.

In a very meaningful way, ladies and gentlemen, free markets in the United States will come to an end. We will have killed the system in order to save it.

-Francis Cianfrocca

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COMMENTS

  • ramblinwreck

    This is why politicians should not be allowed to have anything to do with running the economy.

  • BigGator5

    Good grief. It’s like “damn if you do, damn if you don’t” kind of deal?

    Question, what will happen if we don’t do this?

  • BigGator5

    Follow-up question: Could Paulson’s suggestion be a head fake?

    I mean, why do such a thing while just suggesting “The Bad Bank Of America” has had a positive effect so far. The market hasn’t yet open this morning and it’s already up some 400 points.

  • kowalski

    Saying that they’re going to use stochastic analysis and then stick a finger into the wind to set the price sounds awful, but surely there must be some real value other than zero that these securities, and the underlying mortgages, actually have.

    The problem is that the free market has really failed twice: in allowing the unfettered creation of these instruments which now threaten the world economy, based on a heedlessly debased system of giving mortgages to people who couldn’t afford them on properties in a market that had gone crazy, and then in creating no mechanism of its own for assigning value to them once everyone started to sober up.

    In other words you don’t mention what happened before you went to the track:

    You got drunk and hopped up on methamphetamine at the same time, took all the money out of the bank, and bet not on real horses but hallucinatory horses running around in your mind and on your computer monitor. You were never really at the real track with real horses and jockeys: you were actually in front of your monitor betting on the Fantasy Preakness with 10,000 of your buddies from around the world. Everything was fake except the money.

    Then the next morning, when you came down and you were broke because the fantasy horse race server had a really bad bug and took almost everyone’s money, your rich uncle pulled up to the curb with his monopoly money truck, because in order to save your sorry arse from the very real consequences of your drugs and booze and fantasy horses binge, he has to try to set some real value on all the fake horse races you bet on — because last night you also managed to get three quarters of the world to believe they were real horses through a series of chat windows you had open, and hundreds of millions of other people now own a stake in them.

    And for all intents and purposes, they are real horses now, except that the free market has never before needed a way to assign value to imaginary horse races, at least not on this scale.

    That’s what it seems like to me, at least. Obviously I’m taking a few liberties with the analogy.

    • kyle8

      I would not worry too much about this yet, it is a trial balloon. To get something like this through congress would be difficult. But as Blackhedd said, There will be a fresh round of over-regulation. On top of the regulations we already have, many of which are counter productive.

      BTW it is Sept, 19, Talk like a pirate day!

      AARRRGH!

      • kowalski

        A game of “double bluff” at this point I think would have an almost unbelievably bad effect on the psychology of world markets that would probably never end. Paulson and Bernanke are going to go through with it. You don’t kid around at times like these: the entire credibility of the United States financial system is at stake. Whether we’re killing it in order to save it or not, we have to do what we say we’re going to.

        • blackhedd

          This is a real problem. If we don’t solve it this way, we’ll be bailing out financial firms until there aren’t any left. In a way, it’s a vertical integration.

          The effects of capital depletion from MBS losses are real. They’re not like market panic, which can flare up and fade away in a day. You can’t make these problems go away just by being calm and authoritative.

          • kyle8

            approval for something like this Matey?

  • Illinicon

    that were created to bailout the S&L’s after their problems in the 80′s. As a college student I was more worried about Sesame Street than I was Wall Street at the time. Fox was stating yesterday that what Paulson is thinking about is similar to the RTC.

  • Steven_Willis

    As I’ve tried to explain, the root of the problem lies in poor accounting rules applications. Marking items to a fire sale market is unrealistic and can create serious problems.

    That has to stop. How much government was involved in adopting and in misinterpreting these rules is unclear to me; however, it must act to put them right. Thus I am not so sure we are destroying a market to save it, as opposed to re-setting a market already seriously damaged by government or by quasi-government actions.

    If we require companies to report lower than real values and losses that are non-existent, then we force them into problems, which then multiply throughout the financial system. While I do not know how to value MBSs – and the market seems to be having a tough time of it – valuing them at zero or near zero because others are having “fire sales” is not the solution; indeed, it is the problem.

    I do not like the idea of an RTS; however, in a crisis, what else is possible? Essentially, we re-boot the system and thereby attempt to restore that which we seriously damaged in the past.

    The biggest culprit is a change in our accounting rules that the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the SEC put into place over the past 15 years: Fair Value Accounting. Fair Value Accounting dictates that financial institutions holding financial instruments available for sale (such as mortgage-backed securities) must mark those assets to market. That sounds reasonable. But what do we do when the already thin market for those assets freezes up and only a handful of transactions occur at extremely depressed prices?

    The answer to date from the SEC, FASB, bank regulators and the Treasury has been (more or less) “mark the assets to market even though there is no meaningful market.” The accounting profession, scarred by decades of costly litigation, just keeps marking down the assets as fast as it can.

    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122178603685354943.html

    My current view – which is admittedly fluid – places blame on:

    1. Large accounting firms which expanded way beyond their primary mission of auditing. This resulted in conflicts of interest, poor oversight, and cases such as Enron and Worldcom.

    2. Over-reaction from Congress, such as Sarbanes-Oxley.

    3. Plaintiffs’ Bar which put too much fear in accountants who then misapplied mark-to-market rules.

    4. Poor judgment at the SEC, which pressured accountants into number 3.

    5. Too easy money from the Fed, which helped create the housing bubble.

    As I say, my thoughts are a working theory – and I’d appreciate comments.

  • Harold_Vaughn

    If so, I would rather it happen now knowing that many of these idiots would feel the need to jump from the top floor of a high rise.

    I’m just a normal everyday working man who?s being forced to take this on the chin. Well, I’d just as soon see a few of them go down as well since I’m going to have to bail them out one way or another!

    This proposal is total crap and you know it. The American people are going to be paying for this no matter what, and I for one would rather pay for it in a depression knowing that these idiots didn’t get off scot-free with billions.

    Of coarse I’m an economic idiot, but it sure seems to be what’s going own. This proposal is transferring bad debt from people who have mad billions onto the America workers back, and there is no one in our government with the intestinal fortitude to say hell no!

    • Mr_Green

      At least it seems like it to me. It’s as Blackhedd said, we need to kill it to save it. We either allow the government to intervene now and at least keep faith in the general essence of the free market, or we wait for things to get worse and for people to accept even more dramatic changes and greater levels of government control. Certainly things will correct themselves at some point in the future on their own, but its looking more like it will be later rather then sooner, and odds are that like in the Great Depression before we get there people will start accepting an intervention the government throws at them.

      • blackhedd

        n/t

  • Leverkuhn

    may sound really dumb to you. But I’m going to ask them anyway, because I really want to understand. I have looked up your professional information online, and you seem to be the person to ask.

    1) Is there any possibility you’re exaggerating the severity of the situation just a bit? I mean, you’re actually talking about the “Great Depression II” as a real possibility. With respect to your own discipline, I do know a good bit about American history, and I know how bad the Great Depression was. It was a massive economic contraction in which the overall size of the U.S. economy shrank four years in a row. The unemployment rate actually hovered between 25% and 30% for a while. Is all that really on the horizon? Or to put it another way, take a look at this chart. Are you actually say that is where we’re headed in the near future?

    Technically, the government’s definition of a recession is two or more quarters of negative economic growth, which means that officially we haven’t even had a recession yet. I’m not trying to dispute anything with you. I fully believe that we’re headed toward a recession, and may even be in one right now without knowing it, but are we actually on the cusp of a depression, with all that that entails?

    2) It seems to me that what you’re saying is, “We really should set up this Bad Bank of the United States, even though the end result will be the end of free markets as we know them.” That’s an odd position to take, especially coming from a conservative. So, I guess what I’m asking is this: is there any way we could just not do this? Couldn’t we simply refuse to take this step, and let the speculators eat the loss, even if it means a bad economic contraction? Is that even an option?

    3) How did all this happen? I’m not trying to be cheeky, but weren’t there a lot of really smart people working at Bear Sterns, and Lehman Brothers, and AIG, and all the rest? I’m only asking this because you are one of those very same extremely smart financial minds. (BTW, I mean that with absolute sincerity. Over the last year you’ve helped me understand a lot of things about economics and finance that I couldn’t grasp on my own, and I appreciate that fact.) How did very intelligent people, running a company like AIG with over a trillion dollars of assets, suddenly find themselves in a position where they needed an $85 billion loan from the government just to keep treading water?

    4) Lastly, it seems to me (and remember I’m not an economist or any a financial expert) that most of the current crisis stems from Wall Street’s propensity for trading in securities backed by various kinds of debt, especially mortgages. It also seems that the thing that got this nasty economic avalanche rolling was the subprime mortgage meltdown from last year (which I think I kind of understand). Is that even close to an accurate assessment? If so, how long have people on Wall Street been doing this kind of trading in debt-based securities? I ask this because it seems like a whole lot of them didn’t understand what they were doing when they got into this line of business.

    I’ll get off now and let you respond.

    • blackhedd

      You think that sounds awful? You’ve never dealt with venture capitalists, have you?

      ;-)

      • Leverkuhn

        … and found more than the usual number of typos and other blunders. Sorry about that. My only excuse is that I didn’t sleep much last night, and I’m really tired right now.

        • rstreu

          Steven, your theory pretty much echoes and expands on mine. I think what we’re seeing, in a very real way, is the culmination of the slow death that started with the New Deal.

          The biggest market failures have been in the increasing willingness of the market to accept new government aid and restrictions. Government solutions to market issues, in these cases, have worked less like a crutch and more like a pair of glasses: instead of strengthening the market, they have made the market weaker and more dependent upon the government.

          Which, not to get too tin-foil-hatted, I would suspect was the goal of the New Deal all along.

          • blackhedd

            I disagree with you respectfully on that. And in any case, those rules are with us for a very long time to come.

            VaR is a fundamental concept in the Basel II framework, and you know that when international standards bodies put in a dozen years on something like that, they don’t change their minds again, even if they’re proved wrong.

            Part of the reason VaR became widely accepted was precisely as a response to how the Asian Flu and Long-Term crises unfolded in the late Nineties.

            The policing of counterparties in leveraged transactions through frequent marks-to-market is an essential part of risk management, and I would be very sorry to see it go in normal markets. That said, your point is very well taken, in relation to illiquid markets in times of stress.

            What I think the real problem is, however, is the over-leverage that went into many MBS purchases. When you have a 30-1 capital ratio, as many hedge funds and SIVs did, the last thing you want is for these firms to sit on their losses and be able to hold to maturity. That’s too much like what got Japan into trouble over the last 15 years.

            What we should really do is make it impossible for people to buy things like MBS on a 30-1 capital ratio.

          • kowalski

            And throw in one more number for good measure: the 65 trillion dollars worth of credit default swap contracts (CDS), a number which has grown 100-fold in ten years. I know almost nothing about them except that it seems very few other people do, either. No fair picture of what is happening now can be complete without explaining them, if such a thing can be attempted.

  • Marcus_Traianus

    There is, especially as of late, a very active secondary MBS trading market. Point of fact, divining valuation has been one of the main reasons it is so active. I would only temper that by saying there are certain grades nobody wants because the underlying mortgages either are or very likely to be in default. I suspect this is most of the paper we the people will get stuck with. I also am guessing there may be a portion of middle grade that some institutions may just move off their balance sheet to help liquidity.

    That brings me to valuation; frankly if Treasury should take over anyone my choice is S&P (then Congress, but not necessarily in that order). If anything precipitated this crisis, it was the overt and blatant inability for ratings agencies to place meaningful ratings on MBS. As you know, that drives many financial and risk decisions downstream. My logic is that if someone wants a government guarantee and access to taxpayer money why wouldn?t we let Treasury apply meaningful ratings to asset classes beyond T-bills? This would permit consistent valuation of an institution measured against their overall government rated holdings; works for me, especially in view of the effort to adopt modified IASB accounting standards. But call me crazy, this all makes too much sense.

    Back to the former issue, I believe we have no choice but to get most of this paper off the market. It will otherwise be a drag on the economy and financial institutions; that is bad for everyone irrespective of party. I also believe the move to guarantee mutual funds and other similar consumer level investments for the next year is pure genius for market stability. It appears based on yesterday and today?s futures, the market agrees.

    Two final issues;

    • Thanks to President Bush for moving quickly with Secretary Paulson on this plan. Be a bit more visible on your role, sir.

    • To the Democrat controlled Congress; you suck. For two years you have controlled the financial committees and blocked every attempt at reform such as Fannie/Freddie, et al. Then to make matters worse your chairman and Presidential candidate took huge sums of money from these institutions in an obvious quid pro quo to stop actions which would have help avert this crisis. This has been your tactic going back to 2003 when President Bush and John McCain pushed a plan the NYT called ?the most significant regulatory overhaul in the housing finance industry since the savings and loan crisis a decade ago?. As the minority party you blocked that reform; remember? Then you have the nerve to talk about how you are going to help the American people? You had your chance, buh-bye.

  • joe24pack

    … to offer any suggestion or insight, but I’ve got a feeling that this is nothing more than socializing the losses from irrational mal-investments. The claim that this action is necessary to prevent seizing up of the whole financial system is either a cover to bail out foolish, inept, perhaps unscrupulous participants or just underscores how foolish and idiotic our financial system is. Which ever is true, it doesn’t merit saving, it merits complete overhaul or replacement. Propping up a failing edifice only delays the eventual failure. It’s not like we haven’t completely overhauled our financial systems before.

    • kowalski

      Not personally, but I know my fair share of people who have. And it’s alarmingly close to that in some cases, you’re right.

      This is why I’ve decided to try to make a living in a much more pedestrian business, personally, and just do the best I can at it: at least I know what the costs and the value of the things I produce are, within a reasonable range, and with a risk that can be calculated using nothing more sophisticated than algebra and a desktop calculator. Humble.

      • blackhedd

        And I realized after I posted that I had oversimplified the issue.

        Here’s what I meant more precisely: before MBS issuance froze up early last year (although stresses were apparent in late 2006), valuation metrics were taken from the primary market.

        The secondary market was relatively illiquid, but about normal for your typical non-Treasury debt.

        Then when the primary market went away as the housing bubble burst, there were suddenly no issuance comparables, and spreads on secondary transactions started getting wider and wider.

        At the same time, the credit-quality and ratings problems started to surface. Then regulatory agencies started questioning whether reserves against MBS portfolios should be reclassified at lower tiers of the capital-rating scheme (the whole tier-1, 2, and 3 thing).

        For much of the last few months, there has been great fear of massive liquidations of MBS at fire-sale prices (such as to meet margin calls, like that Carlyle fund that collapsed a few months back). That’s because, with the general illiquidity of the secondary market, those transactions put pressure on everyone else’s marks.

        So it would have been more accurate for me to say that there is a thinly-traded secondary market for MBS. It was wrong to say that there is no market.

  • TomOConnor

    Everyone seems to think that the Government getting involved in any of this is a horrible idea, however, what would the outcome be if they did nothing?

    My view is that if we (read Fed) just let things work themselves out, we would see a freeze of credit that would essentially stop economic activity on a large (read Global) scale.

    Let’s not forget what got us into this mess at the very beginning. During the Go-Go 90′s the Clinton Administration made a concerted effort to increase home ownership in the U.S. Fannie and Freddie were at the forefront of this move along with every mortgage broker in America who decided NINJA loans and other types were a good idea.

    The investment banks that bundled these loans took a risk, there is no doubt about that, but with the default rate of mortgages running around 2 to 4%, the bundled loans should in no way be priced as low as they are.

    As a former floor guy from the CBOT, I think there needs to be a way to package these Mortgage Backed Securities to some degree of standardization so that they would be able to be exchange traded.

    You don’t hear of many exchange traded products getting so out of hand.

  • Vladimir

    I envy your ability to make this stuff semi-understandable.

    • Skanderbeg

      You think that sounds awful? You’ve never dealt with venture capitalists, have you?

      Well, I have. And, believe me, that would be a serious upgrade in the level of intellectual analysis for most of them!

      • Steven_Willis

        I agree mark to market- when a real market exists – is important. But applying that in a time of enormous stress spreads misinformation and creates panic. Hence, I am continuing with the working theory that misapplication of accounting rules are the root of the problem – or at least a substantial part.

        You are certainly correct about the stupidity of large institutions purchasing risky and difficult to value assets with very high leverage. I am unsure whether we should prohibit, restrict, or merely report this. When federal deposit insurance is involved, government has a role in policing behavior. In other cases, I remain wary of government involvement.

        In any event, I have not trusted the large accounting firms for years. Until they completely rid themselves of tax and consulting practices (and brother-sister arrangements do not impress me as sufficient distance), I cannot trust them. I have less trust in international accounting rules – and am very wary of the U.S. adopting them.

        Thanks for your response. I need to think about this much more. Most academics know nothing of finance, let alone accounting and tax policy: they are simply yelling “Bush/McCain did it,” which is not at all helpful.

        • itrytobenice

          And thanks, blackhedd, for your entire series. I appreciate your insight.

          • The_Gadfly

            1) There isn’t a healthy market to establish the price of the MSB
            2) Because of #1, MSBs are being sold at firesale prices for a variety of reasons.

            Now I understood the MSBs to be a diversified mix of different grades of mortgages to max/min the profit/risk. That would seem to imply that the feds ought to be able to establish a number above the firesale price at which they could guarantee they can buy the MSBs, but which is likely to be lower than the real value of MSB. This would put a floor under the price of the MSB so the firesales would stop. I would think it should also encourage the development of a resale market to set accurate pricing, because there wouldn’t be unlimited risk in purchasing an MSB. Why couldn’t something like that be adopted, or is this essentially what the “Bad Bank” will do.

            Personally, I’d like to see a fixed date for the MSBs the government was guaranteeing, say, it only applies to MSBs created before 9/1/08 and anything created after that the government doesn’t guarantee.

  • chrsal

    We the people are responsible for this problem.

    WE don’t keep track of Congress is doing.

    WE don’t read copies of the Fed budget to see what OUR money is being spent on.

    WE keep voting in the same crooks evey election.

    WE do not educate our children about how our GOV is supposed to work.

    The congress (we the people) started this problem by making it law for banks to give loans to people who can’t pay it back. This is PC coming back to haunt us. If the only way out is to have GOV take over the problem they created we have no one to blame but ourselves.

    I only hope that real conservatives in Congress can put the GOV on the track that takes it out of all these ventures in the next 10 years.

    • Marcus_Traianus

      In my estimation, it is very active. I would also characterize new MBS allocations as very “competitive” due to a perception of better valuation and more transparent structures.

      We have not returned to the heady days of, say, Q1 2007 CDO or MBS issuance. Nonetheless, a fundamental stability is returning to the current activity. MBS trading in the secondary market is still somewhere between $300-$400 billion a day (Q1 2007 was between $500-600 billion).

  • sturner

    A few years ago I helped out a good friend who was in a real jam. That friend has never really gotten back on his feet, and I don’t think I’ll ever get paid back for that loan. Now is there a place on the Treasury’s site where I can sell this to them right now? I’ll take 30 cents on the dollar at this point.

    In all seriousness though, what are the long term consequences of this bailout? It seems we will be printing a lot of money, and I’d imagine that can’t be good for the dollar. Will this cause issues with inflation down the road?

    And also, what does it do to the future of the markets? I mean we’ve played our hand and shown that under no circumstances will we allow major companies to fail. That if you are big, you can take all the risks you want. There is no longer fear in failing.

    • bjak24

      That this has to be done. Most of you sound like you are way more intelligent than I am. I also agree that if two knuckle-heads running for President don’t stop with the back-and-forth blame the other side crap….I am going to lose it. McCain needs to use this to his advantage. Instead of constantly attacking Obama on his lack of knowledge, McCain needs to let Obama prove his own lack of the same. McCain needs to hit hard on a solid plan, with details, that outlines why it is not more of the same.

      As far as blame goes…WE are ALL to blame. We as Americans have had it pretty good. The growth we have experienced and the money that has been made has been unprecedented. And most of us have taken it for granted. Americans live beyond our means, we save less than nothing, and the only thing that can mirror the scale of the national debt is our consumer debt. As Buchanan put it, “The party, is over.”

      I heard on a local talk radio show today a caller that says this shouldn’t be done. That we should just let the economy collapse and go into a depression. The reason, he said, was because “no one will learn their lesson.” I disagree. People are learning a leason. Millions are losing their jobs over it, millions are losing or have lost their homes over it, and someone is going to lose an election over it.

      I just hope it?s the right person.

  • dinogroup

    as I sit awaiting the next shoe to drop wondering how many more are there.

  • dinogroup

    Wondering just how many more shoes are going to drop?

  • Flagstaff

    A. Mortgage backed securities have never had a legitimate value-based secondary market.

    Like the vast majority of debt securities other than US Treasuries, people bought them with the intention of holding them to maturity, not to trade them. So there?s no reliable market price.

    This makes sense. With corporate bonds or government bonds, it’s possible to value them somewhat objectively because we can value the entities that issue them. Mortgages are essentially bonds issued by individuals, who initially give them value by proving that they’re credit worthy and pledging to give the lender their house if the mortgage loses value due to non-payment of its “coupons.” Even that risk was mitigated because there has been a growing and liquid market in home sales, so even in the event of foreclosure there was a reasonable chance that the house could be sold without excessive loss.

    I have to admit that from this point on, a lot of the trail becomes obscure for me. I’m not sure just where Fannie and Freddie come into the picture. I believe that they loan money at lower than market rates to mortgage lenders. Or, they buy mortgages from those lenders in order to give them more funds to lend for more new mortgages. I’m not sure. They are the secondary market.

    B. Due to various economic factors, more mortgages than allowed for have gone into default. Apparently, among those factors was the practice of making loans with too little proof of ability to repay, yet passing them on to a secondary lender (or even the original lender) as if they were higher quality loans. Thus, there is no confidence in the credit rating attached to the mortgages, or packages or mortgages, that their holders may now want to sell, and there are no buyers.

    Fannie and Freddie have failed as a result. (Maybe that should be a question.)

    The system is in distress because of the capital losses on MBS. There is no current market for MBS, so their value is effectively zero.

    But that’s not exactly true. They have no determinable sale price, but they still have value, at least most of them do. This means they can’t easily be sold, but it doesn’t mean that whoever holds them will have a 100% loss.

    C. From the standpoint of national economic vitality, we clearly need to maintain a liquid housing market. If major lenders fail this is harder to do.

    Remember I said earlier that your lenders won?t allow you to hold positions on which you?ve had capital losses? That?s not a problem for the Bad Bank. They will be able to hold the distressed portfolio to maturity.

    This seems to be an effective remedy. It may answer one of my questions, which is “Why not just allow/force the holders of bad mortgages to live with them.” I assume because they’d go out of business and the housing market would tank even worse than it has. But wouldn’t the remaining financial institutions, the ones who didn’t indulge in low-quality mortgages before, then be willing to buy up some or all of these loans? As I said before, they aren’t really worthless, just priceless. After all, that’s what the Bad Bank is going to do.

    Given bargain-sale prices paid for these instruments, wouldn’t the new holders then be in a position to allow write-downs on non-performing loans that will allow most of them to become performing again, to keep people in their homes or allow them to sell them under acceptable terms and thereby take much pressure off the housing markets?

    So maybe the surviving lenders don’t have the capacity to hold all those mortgages to maturity, even purchased at bargain prices. The Bad Bank takes care of that problem. I guess I’m on board with that (AAARRRRGH! Pirate reference, although I don’t understand it), but I don’t yet see it as the end of American free markets, if what the Bad Bank is going to do is basically hold all the mortgages they “purchase” to maturity, not engage in MBS trading.

    However, this whole thing seems to be an excellent example of the law of unintended consequences. To lump them all together, the government interfered in the housing market to promote private home ownership. That worked so well they decided that everyone should play the game, even if they couldn’t afford to lose. The result has been market dislocation, which the Bad Bank seems intended to dampen, but there is no way to overcome market forces. The question will be whether the Bad Bank can hold the line until the market and the economy can rebound to the point of stability. At that point the best course would be to extricate government interference from our free market economy.

    Any clarification of these ideas would be appreciated.

    • streetwise

      Oh sure, they could be PRICED at par based on highly optimistic assumptions and assurance bordering on hubris that the assumptions would hold true for the life of the deals.

      And we all know how it turned out.

      Still, half a loaf is better than none. Especially if you’re starving. So on balance, and holding my nose, I approve of what the Dynamic Duo are doing.

      • terilyn

        but to do this. Of course congress will approve it. It’s all about spending our money. That’s all they seem to able to do. Rescue those who made bad choices and let the rest of us pay the bills.

        • terilyn

          I couldn’t agree more! Thanks for pointing that out.

  • Achance

    a lot of CEOs would be suffering from 9mm brain hemorhages about now. I’m thinking if we’re going to have a socialist economy, maybe we should study some of their organizational methods.