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FRONT PAGE CONTRIBUTOR

Shifting The Tone In Financial Markets

Turning From Crisis To Weakness

I’ll go out on a ledge and say that the financial world has taken a step back from the ledge.

A semblance of non-insanity has been apparent in capital and bond markets this week. Now that governments across the world have made credible commitments to prevent financial meltdown (defined broadly as chains of insolvencies among tightly-interconnected counterparties), the violent panic attacks of last week have been damped out.

Term LIBOR, which is a complex of interest rate benchmarks that has been seized upon by mainstream press people as an indicator of the health of the crucial interbank-lending market, has stopped rising. Most of the LIBOR rates have been inching (or millimetering) back from the insane, nonfunctional levels they reached last week. Three-month dollar LIBOR is down about nine basis points from yesterday.

This is still insane and nonfunctional, but at least we’re moving in the right direction.


The US Treasury yield curve is still very, very steep, although we’re in the middle of a hefty bond rally this morning. There is now so much central-bank liquidity out there, simply fantastic amounts of it, that overnight interest rates (such as Treasury-bill repo) are practically zero.

There are very faint signs that capital markets are coming back to life. There’s a tiny amount of term lending now being reported. Capital markets are still frozen solid, but they don’t appear to be getting worse.

But let’s take a look at the real reason why people who aren’t bankers or Wall Streeters even care about financial crises: the Main Street economy. And it doesn’t look good, people.

So we’re all facing one near-term risk (the economy) and two long-term risks (excessive risk-aversion, and overzealous regulation). All are things you need to be concerned about, and that financial markets have begun to focus on.

There is abundant anecdotal evidence that the global economy hit the wall in late September, as the capital-markets lockup directly affected the cost of producing, marketing, and delivering real-world goods and services.

It will take months for capital markets to return to some facsimile of normal functioning. In fact, they may never return to normal, as the heroin of government-guaranteed counterparty performance eliminates the need for efficient credit intermediation.

All of that will prove to be a large headwind against economic growth for quarters, maybe years, maybe longer. Get set for an ugly recession and a weak recovery.

The long-term risks to global economic health are rooted in the natural way that humans react to disasters: they correct excessively in the other direction, and they clamor for revenge.

I can guarantee you that it will be a very long time, decades, before the financial world ever lets itself get as overextended as it did in the runup to this crash.

In the simplest possible terms, the root of the crash was in the systematic underpricing of risk. Now the world will lurch too far in the other direction, and overprice risk, which will diminish the returns to capital, and depress economic activity well below sustainable levels. That’s actually very bad news, but there’s no avoiding it.

And there’s really nothing you can do about it. Watch for stories over the coming years that the balance sheets of the world’s financial institutions will become far stronger than they have been in a long time. That sounds pretty good, but it actually means that they’re hoarding capital received from governments, and holding capital out of the productive economy.

Why is that rational? Because bankers are a very cautious bunch, and none of them wants to get burned in the next crash.

The other thing humans do in bad times is they look for someone to hang.

That’s going to be the financial profession in general, and Wall Street in particular.

One of the reasons that financial markets have gotten so weak is that they’re pricing in the anticipated effects of a huge pulse of vindictive, punitive regulation from the Democrats who seem poised to consolidate their political power next month.

We’re not going to be stopping at capping executive pay (thereby diluting the incentives for success). Democrats are actively looking at bringing back all kinds of structures and processes from the New Deal.

This will all be sold as a way to make the economy “fairer,” and less prone to shocks. Fair enough, I guess you have to expect the pendulum to shift.

But putting the shackles on the financial world will necessarily make it harder for the real economy to produce jobs and prosperity.

That’s the real problem with revenge, as Shakespeare could have told you. You usually end up shooting yourself in the head.

-Francis Cianfrocca

COMMENTS

  • ColbyS

    Given the small number of developed countries in the world, and the speed at which economies evolve, there is a distinctly limited population of economic events to compare this to in the “modern” era. Still, Japan keeps coming to mind. I know it’s been discussed a million times already and I’m not particularly well versed in the conversation thus far.

    I have not studied enough to know whether Japan, back in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, was ever willing to use debt as a tool for growth the same way Americans do. It seems that since their real estate crash of the 90′s they have been exceedingly risk averse and debt-phobic. My understanding is that they endured a decade and a half of purging and they are just now starting to boom again. I hope we are not in for 10-15 years of debt phobia.

    In any case I’m just as terrified as the rest of you of the Newer Deal with the political perfect storm of Democrats forecasted to come into office.

  • streetwise

    In particular, the various regulatory initiatives, coupled with political blackmail, that forced lending institutions to toss their credit standards. Thus people who couldn’t afford homes bought them en masse, and we are stuck with the fallout.

  • tempest

    Blackhedd,

    Thanks for insights on the modestly improving picture in the overnight lending arena.

    What is your take on the municipal bond market. Are municipalities still having trouble issuing bonds? How much worse could the muni bond market get? You wouldn’t think it could get much worse given the power of municipalities to raise taxes to meet operational needs, however, we seem to be unchartered territory.

    I have been very risk averse since Jan ’07 and have seen my muni bond portfolio draw down nearly 20%, which is unfathomable to me given the investments are backed by tax revenues that could be raised at any time.

    Relative to AAA corporate bonds, this appears to be one of the best times in history to invest in municipal bonds.

    Your thoughts….

  • daveinsc

    I think the question on everyones mind now is *How Bad Will it get? * Im struck how the most optimistic observers have downgraded there forcast. There is a consensus of *at least 8.5 % unemployment…scary times indeed…blackhedd how bad do you think it will get?

    • ColbyS

      The Great Depression didn’t really occur in the modern, electronic and global era so I think the best comparison would be Japan 1989-present. Japan had over a decade of deflation and its stock market dropped from 39k to 9k (around 70%). Now 15 years later things are only just beginning to look normal again.

      Similar factors: Japan had a huge housing bubble fueled by speculation and easy credit. This popped, along with a big generation wave coming into old age. Both of these factors are kind of similar to the US.

      Different factors: Japan was heavily re-invested in itself and had a huge trade surplus. The US is much more diversely invested in the global economy and rolls with a trade deficit. This is better for the US because all of Japan’s surplusses made their crash have feedback mechanics that amplified the damage. Also the Japanese are culturally somewhat different from Americans.

      • blackhedd

        So I can’t advise you on this.

        If I’m a state or local government, I’m scared witless by the prospect of lower tax revenues. These people have to meet their commitments out of taxation, because unlike the Feds, they can’t print money.

        But how do you raise taxes in a recession? You’ll just drive all your productive people away, to lower-tax jurisdictions.

        The general objective in public finance is to avoid cutting salaries and jobs at all costs, because civil servants are the core power base of any local government. That means they’ll cut services to the bone. They’ll close all the libraries and the zoos, stop buying bullets for the cops’ guns, and turn out all the street lights before they cut a single civil-service salary.

        That’s how’ll they’ll hold out. The other critical thing about municipal finance is that local government is the farm team for the Democratic Party. You can bet that the new Obama Administration will be funnelling huge amounts of Federal money to municipal governments. Huge amounts.

        • liberalrepublican

          15% or so of the subprime was done by Fannie and Freddi.

          But, the other 85% wasn’t.

          This was a “bubble” – where risk was minimized more and more.

          Warren Buffet called derivatives weapons of financial mass destruction.

          The best and brightest on Wall St fell in love with them.

          • blackhedd

            Japan as a society does not tolerate failure. If you fail in a big way, you’re generally required to kill yourself, so they tend to deny failure rather than deal with it.

            After their real-estate bubble popped, all of their banks were packed with nonperforming assets. Rather than force everyone to clear the decks, Japan allowed their banks to pretend that they were actually solvent, and no one had to come to Jesus.

            To be fair, this is how most Asians deal with bank failures. It’s not just a Japan thing.

            We won’t make that mistake.

          • ColbyS

            And great article as usual.

          • janis

            last night. His prediction of how bad it will get included an approximately 2 year long recession worldwide. He was on the “Charlie Rose Show” which I seldom watch, but found him when flipping channels. He sounded like a reasonable guy. I’ll take two years of recession over 10 years of depression any day.

            Besides, it’s past time for people to quit living exclusively on credit. I know idiots who get another credit card to pay their older credit cards the minimums every month.

  • daveinsc

    I agree a two recession is better than a 10 depression.
    however,
    I think the issue is really about the eventual recovery. If its a slow tepid recovery then we have a serious problem especially if it follows a deep recession

  • Alberta

    “And there?s really nothing you can do about it. Watch for stories over the coming years that the balance sheets of the world?s financial institutions will become far stronger than they have been in a long time. That sounds pretty good, but it actually means that they?re hoarding capital received from governments, and holding capital out of the productive economy.”

    right…so why did we give it to them in the first place?

  • kchand
    1. This downturn is going to be like the early 1980?s.

    2. This recession will be worse than 2000-2002.

    3. The 3rd Quarter 2010 will be the bottom of the business cycle.

    4. 2009 will be recession year.

    5. 2010 will be negative.

    6. Housing market will be down through 2010.

    7. 2011 turnaround? Maybe. Depends.

    8. 2012 will be ongoing improvement

    9. Unemployment up in 2009, 8%-9%, along with inflation. The longer the unemployment, the higher the inflation.

    10.Disposable personal income will have to level off before retail sales pick up.

    Sorry …. that’s just the way it will be.

  • WalterSobchak

    Will AIG need more government $ after the Lehman CDS settlement on 10/21? I’ve read estimates that 100-600 Billion will be changing hands that day.

  • SAZMD

    I’ve read most of your posts but not all, so if you addressed this and I missed it, I’m sorry. I’ve heard some blame everything going on on The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 which deregulated credit default swaps. Supposedly this makes Phil Gramm responsible. What do you think of this argument?

    • dbecraft

      You did leave out that it will be much worse if Obama is elected.

      Take your insight and multiply by 4 would probably be optimistic.

      I do think that the spirit of Americans will overcome even an Obama nation, but it will take a long time…

  • Whitfox

    They didn’t seem to learn much from the internet bubble crash. And I firmly believe that the housing bubble is the fundamental cause here, not risk evaluation. It’s natural for investment firms to think in terms of trends. Long term investments don’t generate such juicy short term numbers. But trend-followers are going to get taken in by any bubble that bursts fast enough.

    Since the banking industry has failed to regulate itself, we’ll have to have government regulation. That’s not necessarily a bad thing. It depends on whether regulations are set up to restrict all trades, or to promote knowledgable trades. If people had known whether their trading partners were creditworthy, there wouldn’t have been a credit crunch in the first place.

    As for revenge against Wall Street, vengeance only begins when fair justice ends. Wall Street mismanagement largely caused their solvency problem. Paulson’s and Bernanke’s ill-considered efforts to save banks resulted in the current consumer confidence crisis. I agree that we shouldn’t punish sound banks with vindictive regulation. But financial institutions as they exist need a major shakeup, as soon as we can afford to do it.