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Obamacare and the Supreme Court: The Mandate Question

In past articles, I have mentioned that the Supreme Court can conceivably delay a decision on the constitutionality of Obamacare if they determine that the penalties through the tax code essentially are a tax and, therefore, the Anti-Injunction Act would put off the issue until 2015. To do so, the Obama Administration would have to prove that the penalty is a tax, something they argued during the debate it was not, but what they asserted in initial challenges to the law. The issue was sort of dropped when Obama began losing in the lower courts, but the Supreme Court unilaterally resurrected the issue now. Another article talked about possible Tenth Amendment challenges specifically through requirements that states increase Medicaid coverage. This involves the so-called coercion theory where the federal government using the carrot and stick of revenue sharing to force states to conform their programs to federal dictates. I thoroughly believe that this may be a better winning argument against Obamacare than relying on attacks on the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause.

Intuitively, the individual mandate would make no constitutional sense. That is, how can the government compel anyone to purchase something so that they can then regulate it? Rightly or wrongly, Supreme Court jurisprudence is not on the side of the challengers. Before people go off railing about the activist Court during the New Deal expanding federal powers under the Commerce Clause, there are also recent decisions that leads me to believe that the Court will actually uphold the mandate as constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause. Of course, if the government prevails in their arguments, then there is essentially nothing that the federal government cannot regulate under the Commerce Clause.

At the risk of being accused of being of the same mind as a liberal jurist, I am going to assert the position, after a considered analysis of Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it exists today, that the mandate will be upheld. First, the ability of Congress to regulate commerce has been considered plenary almost since our founding and dates back to cases like McCulloch vs. Maryland and Gibbons vs. Ogden. In the latter case, the Court stated: “This power is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than prescribed by the Constitution.” Simply applying these 18th century principles, Congress is within its authority to regulate health care, it being part of interstate commerce.

In a sense, there is some hypocrisy here. Conservatives often rail against activist courts. However, that is exactly what some are arguing for in this case. Long standing precedent has established that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide the specific means of regulation. That is not to say that this Court cannot or will not shift course and change an interpretation of Commerce Clause enforcement regimes. That has certainly happened before and that possibility- no matter how unlikely- would be the only hope the challengers have in this case.

Without a doubt, we will hear about a New Deal case called Wickard vs. Fillburn which has rough parallels to the current case. In that case, a farmer grew wheat for personal consumption exclusively. However, the Court then determined that by withholding his wheat from market for whatever reason no matter how worthy the reasoning, that act was affecting the price of wheat generally and that Congress had a right to regulate wheat prices generally. Hence, the farmer’s actions ran afoul of federal law and could be “punished.” Likewise, the “decision” of someone to not purchase health insurance could be regulated since that decision and action adversely affects the costs of health care generally. Of other interest, many people assert that our Founders would be turning in their graves if they ever thought a federal government would force its citizens to purchase a product. That was never, they assert, what the Commerce Clause authorized. They would be wrong. Shortly after the Bill of Rights was ratified, the Second Congress passed the Militia Act of 1792. This law required (and read this closely) that every able-bodied white male purchase at his own expense a (1) good musket or flintlock, (2) a bayonet and belt, (3) a knapsack, (4) a pouch, and (5) a large enough box to carry at least 24 cartridges. In short, under the Commerce Clause and in furtherance of the Second Amendment, our 2nd Congress- consisting of many who actually were present at the Constitutional convention- required Americans to purchase something, just as the 111th Congress is “requiring” those with means to purchase health care insurance.

Recently, even the Roberts Court has recognized federal authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause in the case of Comstock vs. the United States. In that case, a federal law required involuntary commitment of sex offenders to psychiatric centers after their prison term expired. The Court deferred to Congress’ power under the Necessary and Proper Clause by using a means-ends rationality analysis. Using the same analysis, it is hard to see how they cannot now defer to Congress’ enactment of Obamacare and the individual mandate.

There is also another case more recent that will hurt the chances of the challengers to the individual mandate: Raich vs. Gonzalez. In that case, a law against growth and personal use of marijuana was upheld because that act by the offender had an indirect effect on the price of marijuana on the open market and that the federal government had the right to invalidate laws that allowed possession of small amounts of marijuana under the Commerce Clause. I do agree with most libertarian arguments here in this case that are, oddly enough, in conflict with conservative mantra regarding strong drug laws. In fact, one can argue that the opposition to the individual mandate has a greater foundation in libertarian thought rather than conservative thought. Incidentally, it no less a conservative jurist than Scalia who gave great deference to Congress under the Commerce Clause in the Raich decision’s concurrence. For him specifically to now rule against the mandate would require a tremendous rethinking and twisting of his original constitutional analysis of the Commerce Clause. Put another way, he has boxed in his argument because of Raich.

One argument put forth is that if the mandate is upheld, there is virtually no activity or even inactivity that Congress cannot address and regulate. Admittedly, there are two cases where laws have been struck down under the Commerce Clause recently. One addressed violence against women and the other involved Gun-Free School Zones. The Court ruled that nothing prohibited states from enacting similar laws under their general police powers, but that the federal government could not under the Commerce Clause since no commercial action or inaction was implicated. Hence, there are limits on Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.

During the 2010 elections, there was a mini-controversy over interpretation of the Commerce Clause in an unrelated matter- ending discrimination vis-a-vis the Civil Rights Act which was ostensibly enacted and upheld under the Commerce Clause. Then, Senatorial candidate and eventual Senator Rand Paul questioned the efficacy of using the Commerce Clause to achieve the ends Congress desired. In fact, I always thought the better vehicle would be under the 14th Amendment, Clause 5 which granted Congress authority to enact the necessary legislation. Regardless, this conservative desire to reign in the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause is certainly not new and certainly not specific to Obamacare. I might also add that those arguments have been repeatedly, except in a few rare cases, been repelled by the Court.

Again, lest anyone peg me a liberal in this area, I am not. I have written in the past that health care reform could have been achieved without such massive intrusion into the lives of every American. I firmly believe that the law as enacted concentrated more on insuring the uninsured rather than controlling costs for those currently insured which would have benefitted everyone in the end. And initially, and even today, I view the individual mandate as an insult to personal liberty and the basic right “to just be left alone.” However, based upon the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence- absent a massive reversal of precedent (which could happen in the abstract)- the individual mandate will be upheld.

Therefore, since the Court grants deference to Congress here, I believe that conservatives can use the eventual decision to their advantage. The Obama Administration may well crow in an “I told you so” posture, but that does not make the “so” not offensive to the majority of Americans who disfavor Obamacare. The better and best solution is to change Congress and rescind Obamacare in whole or part, preferably in whole.

We should know early on in the oral arguments when they begin which way certain Justices will go. Likewise, their silence may be just as deafening. Without a doubt, someone will ask that if the individual mandate is upheld, is there anything that the government cannot regulate using their powers under the Commerce Clause as a pretext. This is the great “Gotcha” question that must be articulated by the Court. Obviously, non-commercial laws like those struck down with regards to violence against women and gun free school zones are two obvious examples. But, what if at some point the Congress is convinced that the survival of the auto industry, for example, is vitally important to the health of the country? Could they then require that Americans buy only American built cars? Specifically, what are the limits on the power of Congress to regulate commerce? In reality, a defeat for conservatives before the Supreme Court could be turned into a victory by portraying a Congress run amok being antithetical to the will of a majority of Americans. Because they may have the power to “save us from ourselves” is no justification to invoke that power.

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COMMENTS

  • Viet71

    His central argument will be that the mandate is a tax valid under the 16th Amendment. But that’s a flawed argument because of the 16th Amendment’s narrow reach. It only allows the federal government to tax “income.” The concept of income is laid out in Tax Code

    • lineholder

      The focus of the government’s argument has shifted to the “Necessary and Proper” clause. This information was just released during the last few days.

      Here’s an article from TheHill:

      http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/216361-obama-shifts-healthcare-defense

      Here’s the government’s brief:
      http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/U.S.+brief+for+petitioner.pdf

      Here’s is the opposing brief:
      http://www.wlf.org/upload/litigation/briefs/11-398bsacWashingtonLegalFoundation.pdf

      • Viet71

        The Necessary and Proper Clause has been well debated here. It is not a stand-alone clause; rather, it is an amplification of the enumerated powers. Which gets us back to the Commerce Clause. Which is an implausible basis for the mandate.

    • Dave_A

      To wit, the ‘individual mandate’ is a head-tax/capitation, the very sort of direct tax the ‘apportionment’ clause was aimed at…

      Calling it an income tax is laughable…

      • Viet71

        no text

  • Viet71

    n/t

  • davenj1

    And I was unaware the arguments for the current state of commerce clause jurisprudence was laid out in an amicus brief having never read it. I did, however, rely on the arguments by the government and the plaintiffs in each case. And the Obama administrations defense of ACA has been shifting almost with the seasons indicating one of two things. Either there are multiple defenses or the law is indefensible. Personally. I hope Roberts has the backbone to slap down the mandate and make a stand against a government grown out of touch with the people. However, to do so will take some twisting of the current state of the law and in Scalias case, some backsliding. I am not asserting in any way the current state of the law is correct. I am merely stating what it is and as it is, I cannot see the court invalidating the individual mandate. Again, a better solution is either a 10th amendment attack on the Medicaid mandates, or better yet…vote in a congress that will get rid of this monstrosity that poses as a law.

  • rsgp

    I posted this a couple of days ago on another thread and got no help with it, but I assume you’ll have something helpful to say about it:

    One aspect of this issue that seems strange to me is the concept of

    • Dave_A

      Is something you get when a court finds that if one provision of a law can be removed, the remainder will be constitutional & still able to function as the authoring body intended…

      It’s especially common to see ‘severability’ in huge mega-bills that address a wide range of subjects – for example the 1994 Crime Bill that gave us everything from federal funding of local police to the now defunct ‘mean-looking-gun-parts-ban’ (aka ‘Assault Weapons Ban’)… Had one part of that bill been found unconstitutional (and IIRC, one or two parts were) the rest could still operate as intended without the offending ‘parts’, and thus those parts would be ‘severed’….

      The question with O-care, is ‘if the individual mandate is unconstitutional, how much of the rest has to be cut out to make the remaining part OK?’… For example, there would probably be an argument to keep the ‘pre-existing conditions’ and ’26yo-child’ coverage requirements, even if the exchanges/mandate/universal-coverage part were dropped… Of course that would significantly raise policy prices for everyone…

      And off we go…

      • rsgp

        But — and I’m speaking generally as well as regarding Obamacare — isn’t it presumptuous to the point of violating separation of powers — meaning, in effect, the judicial branch legislating — to strip out one element from a law and leave the rest as the law of the land.

        First, it puts judges in the position of assessing the degree of practical impact on other parts of legislation, which I think is more appropriately left to the legislature and executive, but even more troubling is that legislation is often the result of horse-trading, which, at its best, reflects (in effect, via their elected representatives) different groups of citizens reaching a deal in which each gets enough of what they want to tolerate what they don’t want. It just seems intuitively inappropriate for a court to then strip out some/all of what some legislators may have required for their vote (or the president for his signature) to pass/enact the legislation.

        Also, isn’t my second concern above the currently prevailing argument as to why a line-item veto would be unconstitutional?

    • davenj1

      As this case originated, the lower court determined the individual mandate to be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and then ruled that the entire law had to fall as a result. A three-judge panel of the 11th Circuit then affirmed the part about the mandate, but overruled the lower court regarding severability. However, the Supreme Court will hear argument on severability and has, like the AIA arguments, resurrected the issue. Obama could have appealed to the full 11th Circuit but opted to fast track the case to the Supreme Court.
      Severability clauses are normally inserted in laws sort of to cover themselves. It is my understranding that in their haste to get the damn thing written and passed, Congress failed to include one. However, it is also my understanding that courts have upheld laws even though some parts may be found to be unconstitutional in the absence of an explicit severability clause.
      In the current case the argument is that the individual mandate is the linchpin that holds the whole thing together and is the source of funding (among others) for the subsidies to purchase health insurance for those without the financial means. In essence, without the individual mandate, the whole crux of the law falls in upon itself of its own weight in which case Congress would have to go back to the drawing board.
      Regarding the other things in the law, if one remembers, Republican health care reform efforts agreed with (generally speaking) many of the provisions like pre-existing condition coverage, allowing kids to stay on parent’s plans until 26, and so on. It is conceivable that could have been achieved by stand-alone legislation. Obama and company are selling those aspects and specifically wrote them into the law to take effect before the unpopular, possibly unconstitutional aspects took effect. He is making it sound as if the mandate is struck down, then people with pre-existing conditions will lose coverage and a host of other apocalyptic health care happenings.
      I think the question of severability in this case is less technically legal and more practical in effect. On this, I think the Court will affirm the 11th Circuit’s decision, but the fact they are even hearing argument on this question gives one reason for pause.
      Whatever the decision, this will be the landmark decision of the Roberts Courts that will make people forget Citizens United which has defined this Court to date.

      • rsgp

        Do you have any comment on my (admittedly just intuitive) sense that it should be seen as a violation of separation of powers for the judicial branch (in general, not just in this case) to strike down part of a law, leaving the rest intact as law, given that (1) legislation very often involves horse-trading (i.e., absent some provision, it might not have passed Congress or been signed by the president), and (2) it may not be an appropriate role of the judiciary to make practical determinations re: the effects of a law after stripping out one provision vs. the effect of the law with that provision?

        Of the two above, my #1 seems more inappropriate in principle. (I realize courts often consider practical effects as well as literal meaning of laws.)

        As for this particular case, if the mandate is removed but guaranteed issue and community rating are retained, seems to me that would kill the insurance model, perhaps making it literally impossible for insurance companies to be profitable, or at least driving up premiums very substantially. The only thing stopping everyone from just waiting until they need care before purchasing insurance would be waiting periods. And I suppose to some extent concern about emergencies (being unable to complete the transaction of buying insurance before needing treatment).

        But I’m more interested in the general principle regarding severability, particularly when not provided for in the law (and I’m not even comfortable with the idea of providing for it at all).

        • davenj1

          Obamacare does lack a severability clause which is why Judge Vinson struck down the entire law, not just the mandate. Recently, the Roberts Court struck down a certain aspect of the Sarbanes-Oxley law as unconstitutional while allowing the law itself to stand. That law likewise lacks a severability clause.

          Respect for the separation of powers is exactly why the Court will strike down particular sections of a law as unconstitutional while allowing other aspects to remain intact. The major reason they may strike down an entire law with or without a severability clause is when the section in question is so entwined with the remainder of the law that it cannot be disentangled without collapsing the entire law, which was the reasoning in the lower court’s decision. And they may not need reach the practical effects but leave that to the Legislative branch to determine in light of their decision.

          And you are completely correct in your analysis in the final paragraph. Removing the mandate would likely kill the insurance model, etc. which is why it is, in my personal opinion, entwined and cannot really be disentangled which is why the Court brought the issue back up.

          As for the level of comfortability, these clauses, I am told, are common- almost perfunctory in legislation- and derive from basic contract law.

          • rsgp

            Re your comment that:
            Respect for the separation of powers is exactly why the Court will strike down particular sections of a law as unconstitutional while allowing other aspects to remain intact.

            I can see how, in an exceedingly crude, superficial way one could see striking down just part of a law, while leaving the rest as the law of the land, as less meddling by the judicial branch in the workings of the legislative and executive branches (i.e., the creation of laws) than would be striking down the entire law, but in a more meaningful sense, it is more meddlesome and more of an encroachment on the territory of those branches who are the ones supposed to be making laws, because the court is, in effect, creating law when it strips out just part of a law and leaves the rest in place as law, whereas if it strikes down the entire law, it is performing its proper role of eliminating an unconstitutional law and then leaving it up to those other branches to craft something in its place if it wishes.

            For both the matter of practical considerations (the extent to which it’s an appropriate role for the court to decide if one part is “integral” to the rest of the law — if the effects of the rest of the law are sufficiently similar with or without the stricken element) and, even more importantly, because of the aforementioned horse-trading dynamic that is so much a part of the legislative process, not to mention the principle of which branches are supposed to make law, I still don’t see why it is accepted in general that such severability is appropriate, particularly when not provided for in the law, but even when it is.

            If, for example, Republicans agreed to legislation ending some aspect of GWOT (e.g., pulling out of Afghanistan) because the Dems agreed to include in the legislation some tougher domestic surveillance as part of GWOT, then SCOTUS found the latter unconstitutional and stripped it out, leaving just the former, would that not be a totally different animal as law? Perhaps they would find that the two are interrelated enough that severability should not apply, but is it appropriate for judges to be making that call, as opposed to killing the law and letting Congress and the White House start over and work out whatever deal they wish — or don’t wish — instead?

            And what about horse-trading involving parts of a law that aren’t even functionally interrelated, not even related to the same issue, but nevertheless part of horse-trading that is part of the legislative process. If some members of Congress provide the deciding votes on some legislation ONLY because others agree to include some provision that group of Congressmen want — which arguably results in a government more representative of all the people, rather than favoring some, usually at the cost of some others — and then SCOTUS strikes down that provision, SCOTUS will have, in effect, created a law that would not have passed Congress, right?

          • davenj1

            the best way to think of severability is that it is a judicial line item veto of sorts. I understand your very valid points regarding the separation of powers and there is actually a body of legal literature on these issues, some which assert that the judiciary is effectively writing laws. However, a great deal of deference is given to the legislature through analysis of “legislative intent” which can be gleaned from the Congressional Record and debate and such. But, even when legislative intent is taken into account, there are often some goofy results since no one polls the writers of these laws as to what they actually meant or intended from some statutory language.
            But, without severability, it would possibly create a legislative quagmire where laws would have to be written wholesale because of a single section, a single clause, or even a single word. The best case that comes to mind is one from Washington state involving an obscenity law. There the courts ruled that the law was unconstitutional with respect to inclusion of the generally vague term “lust,” but let the remainder of the law stand and the anti-obscenity statute san the reference to “lust.”
            A point of interest here as concerns Obamacare: the original House version had a severability clause, but it was deleted from the final version which passed. The lower court claimed that deliberate omission was proof that Congress intended that if one section was found unconstitutional, the entire law must be found so. In other words, the omission was signaling the courts that non-severability was intended. However, the lower court was reading something into the omission, the higher court determined. They then applied the “legislative intent” analysis and came to an opposite conclusion.
            It is a confusing area of constitutional law and would seem counterintuitive towards the separation of powers constructs in our Constitution. When a law or part of a law is struck down by a court, it is merely a statement that no court will enforce that law with respect to the offending statute, clause, section, word or whatever. In essence, it follows the dictum: “Don’t throw the baby out with the water.”

          • rsgp

            Seems to me that, even aside from the troubling fact that judges lack omniscience regarding “legislative intent” (which may be inherently vague anyway, except if defined in the broadest terms to the bulk of the legislation, and such breadth may not be appropriate as a guideline for judges to change the enacted law to a new, different law, which is what it is if they strike down just part of it), I don’t see how even well-interpreted “legislative intent” would account for horse-trading that very well may have been necessary to achieve passage and enactment of the law. Again, the courts, in effect, create a new law that may or may not have passed Congress and signed by the president. That’s my biggest beef re: the inappropriateness vis a vis separation of powers, although I have other beefs as well (judges deciding whether or not the practical effects are the same with vs. without the provision in question, and judges deciding “legislative intent”).

            As for legislatures having to go back to the drawing board and craft an entire law to replace one that contains an unconstitutional provision, that seems to me the lesser of two evils, the greater evil being the judicial branch creating laws.

            And yes, it does seem comparable to a line-item veto, as I noted in an earlier comment when asking why severability is considered constitutional while the current prevailing view is that the line-item veto is not. In a way, severability is even worse, in that at least the executive branch is supposed to have a role in the creation of laws (input into the process, and his signature to enact), whereas the judicial branch is not supposed to have any such role, as I understand it.

            Thanks again for your replies. Again, great diary too.

        • davenj1

          Obamacare does lack a severability clause which is why Judge Vinson struck down the entire law, not just the mandate. Recently, the Roberts Court struck down a certain aspect of the Sarbanes-Oxley law as unconstitutional while allowing the law itself to stand. That law likewise lacks a severability clause.

          Respect for the separation of powers is exactly why the Court will strike down particular sections of a law as unconstitutional while allowing other aspects to remain intact. The major reason they may strike down an entire law with or without a severability clause is when the section in question is so entwined with the remainder of the law that it cannot be disentangled without collapsing the entire law, which was the reasoning in the lower court’s decision. And they may not need reach the practical effects but leave that to the Legislative branch to determine in light of their decision.

          And you are completely correct in your analysis in the final paragraph. Removing the mandate would likely kill the insurance model, etc. which is why it is, in my personal opinion, entwined and cannot really be disentangled which is why the Court brought the issue back up.

          As for the level of comfortability, these clauses, I am told, are common- almost perfunctory in legislation- and derive from basic contract law.

  • rsgp

    Another question:

    As noted in the diary, the question arises (sensibly, I think) that, if the mandate is upheld, does that mean the federal government can compel the purchase of (meaning penalize not purchasing) anything by invoking the Commerce Clause (and/or any other provision)?

    I suppose it’s possible that a federal requirement to purchase anything is constitutional, given that the federal government can confiscate your money on whatever basis it wants (as far as I know). But what I’m wondering is:

    Is there some constitutional limit to federal taxation, or can the federal government constitutionally tax as much of whatever form of property (income, savings, land, etc.) on whatever basis it wants?

    Is there some implicit constitutional protection against the federal government “taxing” (confiscating) ALL private property if it chose to do so? Or ALL income henceforth?

    • Dave_A

      The ‘federal government can do almost anything with the commerce clause’ deal was pretty much settled by Wickard and subsequent decisions…

      Yes, if this is passed, the federal government would have constitutional grounds to require you to buy, well, anything…

      And no, there is no hard-worded constitutional limit on the power to tax – or most of the other provisions of the Constitution. In most cases, the Founders considered the common sense of the electorate & the check-and-balance nature of our system to be enough to prevent ‘taxing all property’ and similar grievous abuses.

      Remember: A Republic can only last as long as it’s electorate has the common sense to govern themselves responsibly. If the entire society becomes a collection of clueless jackasses, then no document or set of principles will save us.

      The Constitution is meant to be a framework for government by responsible, committed & intelegent men – not a governmental straightjacket designed to accommodate an electorate with the sense of a 2yo…

      • rsgp

        I was just wondering if there was some implicit guarantee in the Constitution of a right to acquire or retain at least SOME private property. Apparently (if you’re correct), there isn’t. I though perhaps something would be derived (based on original intend) from whatever was was written before or around the time of drafting and ratification of the Constitution regarding property vis a vis “the pursuit of happiness” or other concepts, as in Locke’s “Life, liberty and property”, even though the latter is notably absent in the Declaration’s “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”.

        Re: the Constitution not protecting us from ourselves, yes, I realize for the most part we, through our elected leaders, are free to screw things up, but of course the Constitution establishes some limits — i.e., rights that cannot be infringed. I just thought some aspect of property might in some way be part of that, and not just requiring “due process” to deprive someone of it.

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