Bush himself was an Evangelical Christian who was strongly against abortion, gay marriage, DADT, and who was, for all intents and purposes, a social conservative. The Bush administration was far more antipathic towards fiscal conservatives and libertarians than toward socons.

Through my linking of Cato documents, I don’t mean to imply that I agree with all, or most, of their policy prescriptions as they pertain to defense: they were simply the most convenient reputable source of information for this data.

Since I saw some talk of China surpassing us, let me point out that it would, literally, be impossible for them to even match our military expenditures without spending around half of their own GDP on military expenditure, never mind surpassing it: to put that in context, the US’ military budget in WWII as a percent of GDP was around 30%, meaning that to match our rather leisurely (for our economy) 5% of GDP, the ChiComs would have to have a dedicated wartime economy.

Lastly (and in the interest of fair play), I should note that some of those numbers are considered erroneous by some academics. Whatever the exact details, the fact remains that the US far outspends other countries’ conventional militaries severalfold.

Appreciate the comments and points made. As alluded to above, I think that many of CATO’s policy prescriptions above are based on optimistic or flawed premises: for example, I think that they are blind to the perils of a law enforcement-only approach to counterterrorist operations, far too optimistic about the potential for global trade to mitigate aggression, and blithe to the threats posed by non-state actors. I make no bones about the fact that I’m not libertarian on defense. The reason that I posted was because 1) they were the first available and reputable source for the 48% stat (which some where wondering about and which I don’t think is the relevant direct comparison for the points mentioned by JSob), and because 2) they had some valid points concerning the efficacy of “nation-building”, “failed states” and the lack of correlation between them and terrorism exported by the nation, and the fact that other factors are much more relevant when dealing with small states that stand against our interests than the size of our military budget.

This bears repeating, because too many just refuse to believe it: China and Russia are not a threat to us, our allies, or our interests as they stand today, and will not be in the near-, mid-, or long-term. While China has been playing with global “soft” power recently (to very little practical effect), its main interests that conflict with ours have always been regional: the acquisition of Taiwan, possible aggression against Japan, and dominance in Southeastern Asia. None of those objectives is possible for China: in the first two cases, amphibious invasions of developed countries with first-rate armed forces and paramilitaries are very difficult even without our involvement (read on amphibious invasions and on why Normandy was a success while most others were not); with our involvement (specifically our naval and air dominance), they become an impossibility in any practical sense for China, and an attempt by China would easily garner the 100:1 Chinese losses/American losses ratio mentioned by JSob. The last possibility would also be extremely unlikely in a political, economic, or diplomatic sense: even under Obama, when China tried asserting some power over these states, there was significant pushback from those states: even communist Vietnam and Laos stood against it. Our allies’ economies in the region are extremely dependent on the US and Western interests, so it’s a no-go there, as well. An aggressive land war on China’s part in SW Asia would result in near-unanimous opposition to it and would, again, expose it to our overwhelming air and naval power. Russia is a decrepit state with an incredibly poor army: it barely won the conflict with Georgia, and another war would embarrass it further. We don’t need a stronger military to deal with Russia, as our military is more than strong enough as is; we need more assertive diplomacy that treats them like the third-rate military power that they are, and more economic/diplomatic ties to Eastern Europe to ally justified concerns on their end.

To touch briefly on the idea that China and Russia will plow ahead while we stand still, it is not necessary for us to be standing still for us to continue to advance and be competitive in the area of tech and equipment. More importantly, straight comparisons of equipment and tech are faulty; both of those are only important insofar as they are capable of being developed, manufactured, and used on the battlefield. All of the branches of the US armed forces use “outdated” equipment precisely because it is gear that, ATM, is more cost-effective and reliable than newer tech, and manufacturing it is easy. China and Russia (especially Russia) don’t hold a candle to our force projection capabilities and military infrastructure (both that already in place and that which can potentially be put in place). The US could cut back enormously on its military expenditures without affecting its monopoly on quick, overwhelming projection of conventional force. The perceived gains to be made from either country increasing its military expenditures are more dependent on how the US’ involvement in world affairs is perceived than on our current military budget: IOW, our closing of a set of unnecessary airstrips in Central Africa and the Pacific or a base in Afghanistan won’t affect Chinese military expenditures or the decision to go to war with one of our regional allies; our perceived interest (or disinterest) in the relationship does. Our military budget (even our military budget in the region) is only part of their internal calculus trying to figure out how interested we are in protecting our allies and regional interests.

To summarize my positions lest anyone get the wrong impression, I believe that our presence in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America should be minimal to non-existant, that our presence in Western Europe should be massively reduced (and our presence in Eastern Europe potentially increased), that many of our bases in the Far East and the Pacific are redundant, that we should not engage in “nation building” (“nation repairing”, as we did in Germany, Japan, and Europe through the Marshall Plan is acceptable), and that we should not be engaged in “peacekeeping missions”or struggles that do not involve our security or that of our allies in any way, shape, or form. Our presence in Iraq is fine, but our presence in Afghanistan should focus on removing terrorist enclaves as they appear and be restructured around SF and drone missions, not on building the country’s infrastructure, occupying the country, or establishing and preserving democratic structures.

and also consider myself closer to being Jacksonian than any of the others. I simply see no need for much of what we’re doing under the auspices of national security, like nation building and peacekeeping missions. I also see no point in protecting wasteful military spending, or spending on things that do not provide returns (as is the case with a good portion of what is labelled as “military spending”). I see much of our establishment (including a chunk of our military establishment among field officers) as being much closer to the Wilsonian branch.

Some people forget that there is a strong progressive tradition of supporting war (when pressed, most of the “anti-war” crowd is not so much anti-war as it is anti-America or anti-American interests, positing that an America defending its interests in engaging in colonialism or somesuch nonsense) which I’d say would fall under two categories:

1) There are progressives who believe that we should involve ourselves in struggles where there is a great deal of atrocity going on. This group is generally part of the center-left, rather than the far-left (see Bill Clinton and Tony Blair), and sees American foreign policy as an extension of a broader American commitment to freedom and human rights (both positive and negative rights). Sounds nice on paper (and it’s the progressive view that I have most sympathy for), but is in practice impossible to satisfy, and leads to us draining our armed forces in struggles that don’t get us anything for them.

2) The view that American military power should be used to forcibly distribute power equally among nations (not states). This view is mostly rooted in anti-colonialism of a sort: many leftists see American power as legitimate when it breaks up empires (regardless of how much better those empires are at maintaining liberty than the state that comes into place), and when it reduces its own power over what are perceived to be colonies of our own (Guam, for instance). This view prizes self-determination of a nation as overriding other concerns, and IMO, is pretty absurd from any perspective.

IMO, some conservatives tend to buy into the first of these views more than they should.