Redstate

And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

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Even those who learn from history are surrounded by those doomed to repeat it.

I should say that the generality of some of our statements ought to constitute no obstacle to their application to concrete circumstances. To observe, for example, that government is the self-organization of the community for its preservation and the perpetuation of its way of life, is to positively exclude the possibility of a polity legitimized by the recognition of 'rights' and privileges without respect of the specificity of the traditions observed by the subjects of those rights. The immigration and Islam questions come readily to mind in this connection. And to observe, further, that economic science is merely a tool, subservient to the legitimate goods of existence, is to condemn the manner in which considerations of efficiency, profit, and utility are routinely employed to run roughshod over either those transcendent goods, or the conditions more propitious to their realization. The applications of this observation are practically infinite.

Perhaps this is not the level of specificity requisite to a catechism, in which case I freely concede that 'manifesto' would have been more appropriate. But sometimes generality and aspiration, as a form of understatement which requires the reader to extrude the logical implications of what he has read, is the only mode of expression remaining when many people who profess the same political philosophy manifestly do not see certain things; or when the reality of those things is made manifest by a thousand proofs, still profess not to see; or having seen them, immediately begin to temporize and obsfuscate - or, what is still worse, to withdraw in horror, reciting the incantations of the doctrines which precipitated the emergence of the ignored realities. In other words, there come times when reasoned discourse fails, and all that has any hope of availing is a bald statement of fact.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

Some of the most ruinous aspects of Liberalism now go by the name "conservative."

Conservatives like Burke and Reagan have been quite reactionary, in the sense expounded by P. E. More.

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

Relabeling ourselves "reactionaries" and ceding the "conservative" tag to the liberals is not wise. Why not "paleoconservative"? {kidding}

Some of the most ruinous aspects of Liberalism now go by the name "conservative."

I understand the point you are getting at, but the proper solution here is to make clear the distinction between liberals and conservatives in the GOP, not to go along with the redefinition of conservatism.

Liberalism (by which I think we both mean classical liberalism) is founded on a conception of human nature every bit as faulty as that employed by communism. I take this essay as being aimed at enunciating that point more clearly. If so, then, with all respect to you and Maximos, I don't think it quite pulls it off. But I like the project.

This is emphatically not an exercise in "relabeling." It is at attempt at clarifying differences. If all those who call themselves conservative are prepared to assent to this catechism/manifesto, then it certainly helps no one to use the term reactionary. But I think you'll agree that alot of soi-disant conservatives will have trouble with much that is here. Thus, the need for an effort at distinction.

I won't deny, moreover, that part of my purpose is to provoke. As much of our political discourse goes, most of what men have long recognized as conservative principles do indeed appear to be reactionary.

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

but find very little to disagree with in your manifesto. Maybe a genuine catechism (ie Q and A) would have been more effective at drawing the distinction you seek?

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

That Catechism went by the wayside before you ever attended that heretical school. A catechism need not be in question:answer format. The modern one isn't.

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Even those who learn from history are surrounded by those doomed to repeat it.

I was really just going off your definition upthread :) Cant remember a single thing the nuns ever taught me, really. Except that if you need to restroom, don't wait for permission. Just go. (to the restroom).

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

as being a cultural conservative who happens to be in the Democratic party, rather than a liberal in the sense that I believe Paul is using the term.

I strongly trend towards social conservatism in my personal life. However I am pro-Roe, pro-civil unions, pro-stem cell research, pro-gun control in urban settings, and highly Wilsonian/Atcheson-ian in my foreign policy. So I won't be eligible for a GOP card anytime soon.

I actually think of my liberalism as an extension of conservatism. That is, I believe in economic as well as state oppression.

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

it seems that you do in fact find much to disagree with in what Paul wrote.

I believe in economic as well as state oppression.

I believe that such a thing is possible in theory. I don't believe it is a problem in America today or in the foreseeable future. Do you?

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

I take it that you see economic oppression as a pressing problem in America today. I'm curious as to what specifically you are getting at.

i guess saying "I largely agree" is pointless. Heres a point of contention. I find the axiom,

"There no presumption of protection for political discourse ranging over questions of the violent replacement of the Constitution, as the latter not a suicide pact. Sedition is a crime and ought to remain one."

to be in serious potential tension with

"The right of a community to maintain its identity, autonomy, and independence is among the first principles of a free polity."

because of my agreement with the following:

"¶ A government may become destructive of these ends, calling forth resistance from the community. Revolt, like war, should be analyzed through the two-tier method of traditional Just War doctrine: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. A just cause for revolt may be dishonored by its conduct; and even an unjust cause may be conducted honorably."

which leads me to unequivocally dissent from:

"There is a presumption in favor of Free Speech, but it is hardly absolute. Few clauses of the Philadelphia Constitution have been more abused, and twisted from their original meaning, than the First Amendment."

and in fact also ties into my disagreement with

"Indiscriminate blending of cultures is thus undesirable, and more often than not an at least implicit act of aggression against the existing majority culture."

(hope that wasnt too hard to follow :)

I'd summarize my disagreement with a statement of my own. That is,

"Ideas and values have rightness and wrongness - there is an absolute truth. Only by allowing ideas and values toc ome into active conflict can the strong (true) ones prevail over the weak (false). Hencem freedom of speech and multi-culturalism are essential and absolute axioms for the promulgation of superior ideas and values."

I'd also comment that any Constitution that cannot survive sedition is one that is too weak to be worth defending. The solution to bad speech - even sedition - is more speech. To suggest that the Founders intended otherwise is a gross misreading of the Federalist Papers. I find it very strange to see one of your bullet points in your Manifesto praise the American experiment, yet see another seemingly echo Chief Justice Holt circa 1704.

At any rate the Union is worth defending because it is a Union, ie something that transcends Faction (see Federalist #10). You seem to argue that Faction should be limited by reducing the number of Factions. A Union of One (or Few) is however far weaker than one of many.

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

it looks as though I needn't have posted my comment "Liberalism," below, because in fact our disgreement is pretty firm: we know that much.

I think one of the solutions to certain kinds of "bad speech" is legal proscription of said speech. I decisively reject the "marketplace of ideas" formulation, where "the strong (true) ones [will] prevail over the weak (false)" ones, because I think we have abundant evidence, in the 20th century alone, of the triumph, and ensuing catastrophe, of false ideas. The truth will out, in the end; but there is no guarantee that, before it does, falsehood will pull down many great and precious things.

No one said the Constitution can't survive sedition. It has generally survived it quite well: usually by allowing (as our Liberal interpreters will not) laws to repress sedition. Jacobins, Copperheads, polygamists, anarchists, Nazis and Commies have all felt the coercive force of the state act upon their sedition in our history.

As for the Federalist: its primary teaching on bills of rights is against such documents. There is even a repeated phrase used to deride them: "parchment barriers."

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

The truth will out, in the end; but there is no guarantee that, before it does, falsehood will pull down many great and precious things.

That's well and good to say, but it elides the point. The marketplace of ideas is not a utopia and was never sold as such. It is simply the best of the available options. I, for one, prefer the marketplace of ideas -- imperfect that it is -- to reimplementing the fairness doctrine for the airwaves; or to what has been labeled "campaign finance reform."

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.

this

I, for one, prefer the marketplace of ideas -- imperfect that it is -- to reimplementing the fairness doctrine for the airwaves; or to what has been labeled "campaign finance reform."

is hardly what Paul and I have in mind. Suppression of seditious ideas, most of which now seem to emanate from certain corners of the Islamic world - yes. And pace the idea that the Open Society is merely the best of all possible options, our own history is replete with suppressions plainly analogous to that which some of us now contemplate, and the notion that the America of those days was somehow a society writhing 'neath the jackboot verges on the risible.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

is hardly what Paul and I have in mind. Suppression of seditious ideas, most of which now seem to emanate from certain corners of the Islamic world - yes.

First, that wasn't what Paul stated and, second, you're misusing the term "sedition" if you think that sedition is emanating from the Islamic world.

Sedition is a crime against the state by its citizens and should remain a crime -- although limited to its historical scope* (which seems quite a bit narrower than what you or Paul had in mind).

von

*The Alien and Sedition Acts of early Congress(es) were not its historical scope but rather a departure therefrom, as was noted when they passed.

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.

Sedition is emanating from Muslims in America and the West.

I deny that the Sedition Act of 1798 was a departure in the sense that most people argue. See the late Leonard Levy's book The Legacy of Suppression for a glimpse of how Jefferson handled the matter as President.

Jefferson and Madison opposed the Sedition Act fiercely -- on states' rights grounds. Their Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions laid the groundwork for the doctrine of Nullification. I think that era in constitutional history is altogether distorted, if not outright falsified, by the lens of a simplistic morality play, through which it is usually viewed.

We need only look across the Atlantic to see what mischief and massacre the Jacobins were capable of. That America was spared such strife cannot, of course, but credited to the Sedition Act alone; but it surely deserves some part of the credit.

The suppression of disloyal movements has a long (and in my view proud) history in this country. There is little to be ashamed of in our "legacy of suppression." We were by and large right to bring the coercive force of law against Jacobin, Copperhead, polygamist, anarchist, Nazi, and Communist. We would be very right to do so again against the Jihadist.

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

has a growing presence within the border of the United States; and much of the teaching in certain quarters of that diaspora is manifestly seditious.

As regards sedition in a broader sense, I am afraid that we simply will have to disagree. Past suppressions of certain forms of political speech, such as that of communists, while they may not always have fallen under statutes pertaining to sedition, hardly rendered America a jackboot society. I suspect that you have circumscribed your historical scope too narrowly.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

"we have abundant evidence, in the 20th century alone, of the triumph, and ensuing catastrophe, of false ideas"

no. Those were evidence of how bad ideas thrive in places where there isnt enough speech. Not examples of bad speech triumphing over good speech in an open marketplace.

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

The Weimar Republic was liberal and democratic. Spain before her Civil War was also liberal. People were free to talk as they wished -- and they talked themselves right into civil war. Louis XVI was rapidly liberalizing France when that terrible Revolution erupted.

The whole J. S. Mill doctrine of the Open Society rests on a huge contradiction. It posits that "all questions shall be open questions," but even here in this founding act, a question is closed: the question of whether, indeed, all questions should be open.

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

may be twisted to nondemocratic and illiberal ways by force of personality; witness that Hitler's rise to power was entirely on the basis of allocating more power to himself by fiat and supine legislature. Thats a lesson for separation of power and checks and balances. The same process inexorably creeps on in Venezuela.

its too simplistic - and in fact quite wrong - to say that the people talked themselves into civl war. The talk was a symptom, not a cause. The underlying forces were again ones that were unaccountable and self-interested and who therefore exhorted the people to their ends; the problem essentially again amounted to lack of enough countering speech.

Banning speech does nothing to stem the underlying sentiments; if anything it channels them into less easily countered avenues.

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

are ultimately warranted by the fact that human nature is not an instance of essentially disincarnate reason accidentally inhabiting a corporeal body, from which all nonrational factors and influences emanate. Those nonrational aspects of human nature are integral with that nature, co-equal with reason, in some respects, and in the well-formed soul, each set of faculties will assume both its proper place and its right measure.

The wound of man's being, however, his tendency towards disorder and excess, means that his passional aspect occasionally threatens to overwhelm order. And while it is certainly true that Jacobinism, for example, originated in a defect of reason - reason detached from sentiment and tradition, seeking to compass all things by its own measures - the appeal of Jacobinism, the force that motivated hordes to act in accordance with the dictates of the tribunes of reason, were most certainly nonrational. So also with communism.

The reason, therefore, for the proscription of certain ideas, doctrines, and lines of inquiry, lies in the fact that the overwhelming majority of men will not entertain these questions at anything like the level of disinterested reason requisite to their resolution upon that plane. They will be motivated by many factors, some rational, some not, and some altogether verging on the inhuman, as history attests. It is in order to extinguish, or even prevent from forming, these fires in the minds of men, that we may declare certain questions closed and certain subjects forbidden. The Open Society model of the clashing of opposed ideas, that the stronger, more rational, may prevail, founders upon the fact that most men are not now, nor ever will be, philosophers. Most of them, in fact, disdain the philosopher, a fact I may rue, but cannot alter.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

Unless I misunderstand Liberalism completely, it seems to me that these precepts (just to begin with) would encounter immediate opposition:

¶ A healthy polity will have a majority population and culture; contemporary orthodoxy on diversity tends towards anarchy and strife.

¶ The right of a community to maintain its identity, autonomy, and independence is among the first principles of a free polity.

¶ Tradition and custom need not constantly explain or justify themselves as practice or policy. The presumption is in their favor. To drag them before the bar of a rigid rationalism is profound impiety.

¶ The Liberal compact, by which questions of ultimate existential import are bracketed, and questions of temporal prosperity and the adjudication of rights-claims pursued, is an act of violence against human nature, a displacement that occasions the rise of messianic political doctrines.

¶ The traditional family — mother, father and children — must be privileged in law and in society; no other relationship is permitted to assert equality or parity with it.

Majority rights, a presumption in favor of tradition, privilege for the traditional family, an open repudiation of the Lockean bargain -- how can these square with Liberalism?

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

hmm. A capital letter does not a definition make, Paul. This is why we so often seem to be in disagreement when in reality you are substituting a capital for a rigorous definition that we can probably agree on.

"A healthy polity will have a majority population and culture; contemporary orthodoxy on diversity tends towards anarchy and strife."

I agree with the first part; I registered my dissent woth teh second part above.

"The right of a community to maintain its identity, autonomy, and independence is among the first principles of a free polity."

strongly agreed, see above. (or maybe below.. dunno where in teh thread I am actually)

"Tradition and custom need not constantly explain or justify themselves as practice or policy. The presumption is in their favor. To drag them before the bar of a rigid rationalism is profound impiety."

It may indeed be impious and hence I woudl also hesitate to do so. But a thing being impious doesnt neccessarily ean it must be done on occassion. I am thinking specifically of segregation and civil rights, whose status as "tradition and custom" were unassailable. I will be as impious as needed - even against tradition and custom - because there are things that are more important than either.

"The Liberal compact, by which questions of ultimate existential import are bracketed, and questions of temporal prosperity and the adjudication of rights-claims pursued, is an act of violence against human nature, a displacement that occasions the rise of messianic political doctrines."

I dont know what you mean by "Liberal Compact" so have no way of evaluating this statement.

"The traditional family — mother, father and children — must be privileged in law and in society; no other relationship is permitted to assert equality or parity with it."

I agree. but I believe that the law is not teh right venue to define it; hence I would leave the definition of marrriage completely outside the law and in the hands of personal conscience or church. I favor civil unions as a excecize in sharing assets and property rights.

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Dean Nation is now Nation-Building: Purple politics, muscular liberalism, principled pragmatism

but I believe that the law is not teh right venue to define it; hence I would leave the definition of marriage completely outside the law and in the hands of personal conscience or church. I favor civil unions as a excecize in sharing assets and property rights.

Is perfectly illustrative this:

"The Liberal compact, by which questions of ultimate existential import are bracketed, and questions of temporal prosperity and the adjudication of rights-claims pursued, is an act of violence against human nature, a displacement that occasions the rise of messianic political doctrines."

If the structures of the traditional family are essentially reduced to nothing more than private observances and affectations, then they have most assuredly been bracketed off from questions of the organization of society and the adjudications of claims of right and property. And if the only socially meaningful -in the sense of being perceived to be normative and carrying certain privileges and also, negatively, sanctions - institutions are the "I wants" (rights) and "I haves" (property), then we are left with a rather dessicated and unworthy sort of existence.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

Re: If the structures of the traditional family are essentially reduced to nothing more than private observances and affectations

You say "nothing more" as if the things you dismiss are trivial. But I would suggest that tradition and the passions are in fact prior to the law (historically and ontologically both) and therefore superior to it. If "affection" and "custom" cannot sustain a family then the law certainly cannot. You might as sell be King Canute ordering the tide out when you think the law can say to spouses "Love each other". This is in fact a prime example of the very statist delusion that Paul, glancingly, touches on, the tendency of conservatives to buy into the thinking of liberals, of which the belief in the omnipotence, or at least omni-competence, of government, is one such tenet. In a truly just society there would be entire realms of human existence into which the state was not allowed to enter lest, like the proverbial bull in the china shop, it do great damage no matter how noble its intentions. Do you realy think that in the past 200 years since the state has taken over direction of marriage it has improved the institution?

If "affection" and "custom" cannot sustain a family then the law certainly cannot.

By observing that if the love an affection that members of homosexual couples presumably have for one another cannot sustain them, then legal recognition of their unions, amounting to a parody of marriage, certainly will not.

tradition and the passions are in fact prior to the law (historically and ontologically both) and therefore superior to it.

Tradition is indeed logically and ontologically prior to law, which is the effort of the community to protect and secure tradition, from which it follows that tradition - and here we refer to tradition concerning the fundamental basis of civilization, and to tradition concerning cuisine - that never achieves legal recognition is naught but an abortion. And as for the passions, which I take to be disordered appetites, or appetites indulged beyond licit measure, I'd rather they not achieve positive status in law; hence, my opposition to "marriage reform", be it same-sex unions or the "privatization" of marriage.

As for this:

You might as sell be King Canute ordering the tide out when you think the law can say to spouses "Love each other".

Of course, this is merely a red herring. No one ever claimed that the state could compel spouses to love one another. The state, however, manifestly can recognize what marriage is, ontologically, and so define it in accordance with its nature. In fact, this is really the only thing the state can do with respect to the institution without becoming that raging bull in the china shop. One either recognizes reality, or, as the old language put it, kicks against the pricks.

And as for the matter of government involvement in marriage, we can either have this, or we can have eccesiastical courts with authority over marriage customs and practices, as was the prevailing custom prior to the secularizing trend of modernity. Since this will not fly in a religiously plural society, I'm afraid we are stuck with the state. Now, that state can either recognize the nature of reality, or it can ordain that marriage shall be whatever private parties deem it to be for them, in which case it will be still be involved in marriage law, not only enforcing contracts and the like, but defining the institution as, essentially, anything and nothing at all. To invoke a right is to invoke a conception of, pardon the term, normativity.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

Re: Now, that state can either recognize the nature of reality

Well, gay couples are also a part of that reality. Though far fewer in the number, what excuse is there to recognize some part of reality rather than the whole of it?
By the way, I actually wouldn't mind going back to letting churches rule their own marriage laws. What would be wrong with this? Let Catholics wed (and then not divorce!) according Roman Catholic canon law, liberal Protestants do so according to their church regulations, conservative Prortstants according to theirs, The Jews according to the Jews and so forth. Yes, I know, the secularizers would have an unholy cow over it, but I do think much good would come letting the churches have a true and important public role, at least in regards to their own congregrants, rather then treating them as mere baubles on the public tree.

The reality which the state ought to recognize is not that of brute factuality, within which there are not merely homosexuals, but pedophiles, necrophiliacs, and zoophiles, but that of the ontology of things, of the nature of things as discerned by their forms and ends, in which case homosexuality has no positive status whatsoever.

As for the question of ecclesiastical authority over marriage, you have quite missed the point, and I would counsel a re-read.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

Liberalism (by which I think we both mean classical liberalism) is founded on a conception of human nature every bit as faulty as that employed by communism.

I'm comfortable being labeled a classic liberal (though I don't think it fits perfectly), so that second statement piqued my interest. I'm curious what you're getting at in that when you state that classical liberal's "conception of human nature" is "every bit as faulty as that employed by communism." Certainly, the "reactionary" of Messrs. Cella's and Maximos's conception is at odds with the classic liberal on a great many things. But I think that the comparison to communism -- something sure to get classic liberal types riled up since, if nothing else, they are invariably anti-communist -- is an overstatement at best.

Indeed, it seems to me that both the "reactionary" and the classic liberal share some common ground in diagnosing the problems. It's in the solutions where they differ most. Consider, purely for the sake of argument, my reaction to the first two points:

¶ Human nature is not elastic, but rather constant; and the corrupt aspects will always be with us.

¶ Man is indeed a reasoning being, but often he is moved by nonrational factors. These latter do not bear an intrinsic mark of censure.

My only real objection is to the italicized portion, and only becaue its written so eliptically that I'm not quite sure what it means. Surely, there are nonrational things that do not deserve "censor" and, surely, that a thing is nonrational does not mean that it is ipso facto wrong. But this is not controversial. If Messrs. Cella and 'Sos mean to say that a nonrational factor should be given support where it is shown, by reason and experience, to cause harm or inequity -- well, of course I get off the boat. But I'm not sure that Cella and 'Sos wouldn't join my disembarkment.

von

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.

I won't presume to speak for Mr. Sandor, but I think Communism and Classical Liberalism share several things in their conception of man.

(1) Materialism. In Communism, of course, this is much more explicit; but in both there is a decisive establishment of material well-being as the purpose of political life.

(2) Both posit an aboriginal "state of nature," though from there they move on to different things. Communism takes from Rousseau the view that the first property owner was a thief, and thus that the regime of private property is illegitimate. Classical Liberalism takes from it the view that man is in essence a selfish being, driven by a desire for acquisition.

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

(1) Materialism. In Communism, of course, this is much more explicit; but in both there is a decisive establishment of material well-being as the purpose of political life.

Granted that this is a similarity, but there are very few political theories in which materialism -- defined as you use it -- does not rank somewhere in the top 3. And this hardly saves Sandor's point from being a severe overstatement.

(2) Both posit an aboriginal "state of nature," though from there they move on to different things. Communism takes from Rousseau the view that the first property owner was a thief, and thus that the regime of private property is illegitimate. Classical Liberalism takes from it the view that man is in essence a selfish being, driven by a desire for acquisition.

Wait a second: Does not "Reactionarism" -- as is being debated here -- also posit an "aboriginal 'state of nature,'"? Is not your very first point "¶ Human nature is not elastic, but rather constant; and the corrupt aspects will always be with us"? (Emphasis added.) And why not recognize in one's political philosophy that one such aspect of human -- whether corrupt or otherwise -- is that humans almost always pursue their self interest above all else?

In other words, I do not think that second point proves what you mean it to prove.

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.

there are very few political theories in which materialism ... does not rank somewhere in the top 3.

The only place that matters is the top place. Both Liberalism and Communism posit materialism as their starting point for their picture of man as a political being.

Does not "Reactionarism" -- as is being debated here -- also posit an "aboriginal 'state of nature,'"?

No, it does not:

The institution of the State emanates from the nature of man, who is a political animal, organizing collectively to shelter his tradition and community.

Man always expresses the sociality of his nature; the only differences are those of degree. Pure “state-of-nature” individualism is an illusion or a willed act of renunciation.

And why not recognize in one's political philosophy that one such aspect of human -- whether corrupt or otherwise -- is that humans almost always pursue their self interest above all else?

We do not deny the power of selfishness. The problem lies in your phrase "above all else." In the Muslim world, for instance, it seems that there are more powerful forces that mere self-interest.

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And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

Re: In the Muslim world, for instance, it seems that there are more powerful forces that mere self-interest.

I'm not sure that's true. The 9-11 hijackers do seem to have sincerely believed that Paradise awauted them for their deed. Were they not therefore following their self-interest? And certainly the horde of thugs and theocrats who run the place are following their own self-interest in amassing wealth and power, like all tyrants.

when classical liberalism is talking about economics (and related political matters) it is indeed talking about things that are by nature material. Just as a professor of geology giving a lecture on his topic is talking about things that a terrestial and not native to some distant galaxy. The difference between the Marxist and the classical liberal is that the former would go on to say that Matter is all that exists while I doubt either either Mr Locke or Mr Jefferson would have affirmed that dogma.

For some reason, this happened to make me think of Mike Griffin's speech about "Acceptable Reasons" and "Real Reasons" for going to space, which touches on this in some sense.

than either would care to admit.

Paul already touched on this, but since you asked me I'll respond. Marx drew heavily on contemporary liberal thought, and his ideas have deep roots in classical liberalism. Specifically, the idea of the fundamental equality of all people, and the belief that economic thinking is the main prism through which to examine the world, are common to both Marx and to classical liberalism.

They also have very similar end points in mind. The Marxist withering away of the state sounds a lot like the goal of what has been called "millennial capitalism", in which everyone in the world will peacefully coexist and trade with one another, and freely move about the world, in the pursuit of their mutual and peaceful economic advantage.

I’d say that Marxists disagree(d) with liberals about how to get from point A to point B, but not that the points existed and that point B was a worthy destination.

The classical liberal conception of human nature is that man is a rational economic actor who will behave in certain rational and predictable ways in the pursuit of paticular ends which classical liberalism regards as in everyone’s best interests. That has never been an accurate description of human behavior and it’s unlikely that it ever will be. A society that attempts to build itself on this erroneous view of human nature will not survive.

The classical liberal conception of human nature is that man is a rational economic actor who will behave in certain rational and predictable ways in the pursuit of paticular ends which classical liberalism regards as in everyone’s best interests.

I don't think that ever was classical liberalism's conception of human nature; it seems instead to try to sum up the assumptions present in certain economic models (which themselves recognized their imperfections, ergo, model). Classical liberalism holds that, more often than not, individuals are better at running their own lives. It does not assert (or require) that they will behave predicably -- although they frequently do, as the Western canon will teach you (as will other traditions, but best stick with the familiar). It also does not posit a stateless society or dream of a utopia: to the contrary, it quite specifically requires the state to take an active role in defense, mediating disputes, and ensuring that the rules are upheld. Indeed, it's downright weird to seem Adam Smith and David Ricardo assumed to be utopians (as Marx and Engels were) -- much less to take the position that Friedman, Hayek, or Mills (!) were utopian thinkers.

You are correct that Marx and Mills share a view that humans are driven by self-want, although Marx limits his view to economic self-want while Mills is far broader in his concerns. I don't think that's all that controversial a point. Indeed, markets are so successful at allocating goods and services -- as compared to other forms of direction -- particularly because people look out for their own interests. This, in itself, is good evidence that the central insight of classical liberalism should be respected. (Note, of course, that classical liberalism neither assumes nor requires that individuals be solely guided by their self-interest or that its predictions always be right and correct; only that self interest is a better guide than the available alternatives.)

Finally, someone always brings up Islamist radicalism here, and argues that this somehow proves that individuals are not inclined toward self-interest. They do so because they fail to recognize that, to the extent that Islamic radicalism (and other forms of radicalism) are exceptions, they are exceptions that prove the rule. We find Islamic radicalism so perplexing and frightening precisely because they do not fit our predictions regarding how individuals behave -- predictions that have served us so well with in so many other situations and with so many other peoples (including the vast majority of Moslems).

von

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.

Was this in reply to me or to someone else?

I made no mention of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, or utopia. You asked me what similarites I saw between Marxism and classical liberalism, and I told you. I don't see this as being controversial. The Declaration of Independance is a summation of classical liberalism and it it comes flat out and states that all men are created equal. The economic roots of liberal thought go all the way back to Locke and the value he places on property. If you disagree, tell me where.

Properly understood, I think classical liberalism is not hostile to the idea of the nation state, and I don't believe people like Adam Smith understood it in that fashion. Nor did Hayek, who was open to the idea that freedom and free markets were an idea impossible to transplant outside the West, or even the Anglo-Saxon world.

I don't think that I'm revealing classified information in pointing out that there are a great many people these days, who call themselves classical liberals, libertarians, and capitalists, who do envisage the end of the nation state and some sort of free market utopia to follow. There are people out there who think that Smith and Hayek were old-fashioned statists.

Let's call these people "utopian-capitalists", to distinguish them from the traditional classical liberal. However, they usually claim to be followers of classical liberalism who are seeking to extend its teachings both worldwide and into all aspects of life in America. It's these people to whom I believe Paul is throwing down the gauntlet.

someone always brings up Islamist radicalism here, and argues that this somehow proves that individuals are not inclined toward self-interest.

It can be argued that no matter they do, people are always acting in their own self-interest; that they would not do whatever it is if it were not in their self-interest. In this sense a soldier storming a machine-gun nest is still acting in his self-interest. However, lets not go there.

I'm arguing that one of the key ideas behind classical liberalism is that of fostering coperation based on the idea of mutual economic advantage. And I'm saying this idea is of limited value. It's true, to some limited extent, but it breaks down very quickly if there are other interests at work.

We find Islamic radicalism so perplexing and frightening precisely because they do not fit our predictions regarding how individuals behave

No need to look so far afield. Liberals (Dems) are perplexed also. "What's the matter with Kansas?", they cry, confused that the good people of that state do not behave in accordance with liberal theory. And the people of New York are no better. They vote in droves for politicians who promise to raise their taxes.

There are whole libraries of research out there on human behavior, and it overwhelmingly suggests that all people place things like culture, ideology, race, ethnicity, and religion ahead of what liberalism sees as their rational and economic self-interest.

Was this in reply to me or to someone else? ....

[snip]

Let's call these people "utopian-capitalists", to distinguish them from the traditional classical liberal.

I probably misread you. If we're in agreement that there's a difference between a classical liberal (or classic liberal, as I prefer) and what passes for the modern Libertarian party, then our differences on this point are not so great.

I'm arguing that one of the key ideas behind classical liberalism is that of fostering coperation based on the idea of mutual economic advantage. And I'm saying this idea is of limited value. It's true, to some limited extent, but it breaks down very quickly if there are other interests at work.

Strike the word "economic" from that statement, and I think you're closer to the mark, i.e., "one of the key ideas behind classical liberalism is that of fostering coperation based on the idea of mutual advantage." The advantages need not be economic (though they frequently are).

Moving out of the realm of classic liberalism and into the realm of economics, I think that you overstate the claim made regarding the advantages of economic trade. The argument is not that trade fosters cooperation. The argument is that trade is ultimately to the advantage of everyone involved (put very roughly, via the mechanism of comparative advantage), and that, as a result, parties that trade together are less likely to go to war with one another, or to take provokative action against one another. I think that's a pretty noncontroversial point: A big reason why China does not simply crush Taiwan -- which it easily could, for it fears no effective military response from us -- is because it would jeopardize its trade relationships with us, Japan, and the EU. The cessation of trade presents a cost that restrains violence and, if an embargo is not a regime-defeating tool, it certainly is a regime-weakening one. It fosters peace. But it does not necessarily lead to cooperation.

No need to look so far afield. Liberals (Dems) are perplexed also. "What's the matter with Kansas?", they cry, confused that the good people of that state do not behave in accordance with liberal theory. And the people of New York are no better. They vote in droves for politicians who promise to raise their taxes.

Because they believe that the taxes provide them an advantage in creating a society that they enjoy.

There are whole libraries of research out there on human behavior, and it overwhelmingly suggests that all people place things like culture, ideology, race, ethnicity, and religion ahead of what liberalism sees as their rational and economic self-interest.

Culture, perhaps. Ideology, I suspect not as much. Race and ethnicity? Nil -- and, yes, I've looked at some of that stuff and, yes, I think it total and utter crap, so let's not ruin a polite conversation with a needless digression. Religion? Somewhat, perhaps.

The bottom line, however, is that markets work for a reason: whatever factors influence decision making, self interest (rational or otherwise) does as well.

For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act, and of acting, too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection.

Agreed, its a subject for another time. Mainly because this thread is already getting unwieldy, rather than being off topic. A description of human nature has to underlie any system of political thought, and the sociological data has much to say on that topic.

If you are still following this, you can find an illustration of what I'm speaking of in the discussion thread here. There are more than a few people who consider the proper application of capitalism as requiring the obliteration of national boundaries and the dissolution of the people of the world into a single labor pool.

it would seem to follow that, if human nature is constant, it will manifest itself similarly in all human beings

No, I don't think this follows. Notice the several statements relating to variety. Some core characteristics are common to man, but there working out in societies, traditions, etc. vary so wildly as to preclude the sort of "sameness" you posit here.

_____________
And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.

I think that any of your statements regarding variety would have the same problem. The wildly varying "working out" of core humanity in various societies, etc., necessarily implies elasticity. You can say that this elasticity attaches to something other than human nature, but the more significant you find such variation, the more fundamental the thing to which such elasticity attaches must be. And it seems to me that something cannot be called fundamental without touching significantly on questions of human nature and speaking to its content. "Tension" might be a better word than "contradiction" for what I'm asserting on this point. There are some distinctions one might make to resolve this, but I am not comfortable with any of those that occur to me.

My own view, for what it's worth, it that the variation between cultures (and change over time within cultures)is usually not as significant as it seems, that seeming differences often either mask underlying similarities, or else they are merely driven by contingencies and are therefore unsustainable. I would guess that we end up mostly in the same places on particular issues, just arriving by different roads. For instance, you might oppose "celebrating diversity" because it is corrosive of society, whereas I oppose it because I think it's trivial and distracts us from more important matters.

Presumptuous man! the reason wouldst thou find,
Why formed so weak, so little, and so blind?
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess,
Why formed no weaker, blinder, and no less.

The wildly varying "working out" of core humanity in various societies, etc., necessarily implies elasticity.

Actually, the instantiation of a common human nature in a diversity of concrete cultural expressions implies, not elasticity, but finitude: the inability of any man, or society of men, to manifest simultaneously, or even historically, the manifold ways in which men may strive to realize the good of their nature. To state that those wildly varying workings out of core humanity imply an elasticity of nature would be analogous to stating that, say, the wildly varying expression of the human species in different races implies an elasticity which calls into question the unity of the genome.

My harp is turned to mourning, and my organ shall speak with the voice of them that weep. Spare me, O Lord, for my days are truly as nothing.

I largely agree with what you say immediately above. But doesn't a strong, or any, conception of human nature (as opposed to such things being postmodern "constructs") imply limits on the possible variation of human societies? And the stronger such a conception, the stricter these limits?

For instance, if it is somehow written in our nature that murder is wrong and must be answered, it would be impossible for there to exist a society in which murder would be condoned and go unanswered. Indeed, there is no reliable report of such a society throughout history--unsurprisingly, as its members would die off rather quickly. There is some variety in precisely how murder is defined, as there is in how it is to be answered, from the medieval Icelandic feud system to our modern courts. I would emphasize, however, that all such systems lead to largely the same place: People know that murder is wrong, and failing that, they know that if they commit murder, they will likely be punished. In the end, the vast majority of murders that might place do not take place. Why, just today I failed to commit at least a dozen murders. (And despite the violence of the Norse sagas--the Law & Order of their day--most medieval Icelanders died natural deaths.)

The more such universals you pile upon to your conception of human nature, the more limits you place on the possible variation of human society. (If music is a human universal, then all societies will have music.) I happen to think that there are very many such universals, and so that there are very strict limits on the possible forms of human society. For every human society must possess a large number of such characteristics. However, if you think that human societies vary wildly and do not possess very many such characteristics, then you are consequently limited in the number of human universals you can posit, thus weakening your conception of human nature. In other words, I am positing an inverse relationship between the strength of one's conception of human nature and the amount of societal variation one may consistently assert.

If one's conception of human nature is so weakened, there might still be constancy in what remains, but the nature of individual humans must be "elastic" in the many aspects of their existence that human nature cannot now touch upon. So human nature, under this scheme, may be constant but must be trivial.

Presumptuous man! the reason wouldst thou find,
Why formed so weak, so little, and so blind?
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess,
Why formed no weaker, blinder, and no less.

I'm going to have to go with that. Culture, in my view, is much more significant than human nature in determining how people behave. It's practically the definition of culture that it does override human nature.

it would be impossible for there to exist a society in which murder would be condoned and go unanswered. Indeed, there is no reliable report of such a society throughout history

It is all in the definition, as you go on to say. The members of a society cannot condone murder within their group, or there will not be a society. They can of course be downright exuberant about murder outside the group. For example, the Spartans and their helots, or the Romans and their slaves.

But I think this is the key issue. Classical liberals tend to believe in a single universal human nature, while conservatives do not. Johne and I have had some interesting exchanges on this very topic.

human nature is paramount, as it produces cultures. The best essay on what is being discussed here is a chapter in CS Lewis's "Mere Christianity", which addresses all of the seeming departures of culture being discussed here:

The Law of Human Nature
From Mere Christianity by C S Lewis

Every one has heard people quarrelling. Sometimes it sounds funny and sometimes it sounds merely unpleasant; but however it sounds, I believe we can learn something very important from listening to the kind of things they say. They say things like this: 'How'd you like it if anyone did the same to you?' - 'That's my seat, I was there first' - 'Leave him alone, he isn't doing you any harm' - 'Why should you shove in first?' - 'Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine' - 'Come on, you promised.' People say things like that every day, educated people as well as uneducated, and children as well as grown-ups.

Now what interests me about all these remarks is that the man who makes them is not merely saying that the other man's behaviour does not happen to please him. He is appealing to some kind of standard of behaviour which he expects the other man to know about. And the other man very seldom replies: 'To hell with your standard.' Nearly always he tries to make out that what he has been doing does not really go against the standard, or that if it does there is some special excuse. He pretends there is some special reason in this particular case why the person who took the seat first should not keep it, or that things were quite different when he was given the bit of orange, or that something has turned up which lets him off keeping his promise. It looks, in fact, very much as if both parties had in mind some kind of Law or Rule of fair play or decent behaviour or morality or whatever you like to call it, about which they really agreed. And they have. If they had not, they might, of course, fight like animals, but they could not quarrel in the human sense of the word quarrelling means trying to show that the other man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in trying to do that unless you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are; just as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football.

Now this Law or Rule about Right and Wrong used to be called the Law of Nature. Nowadays, when we talk of the 'laws of nature' we usually mean things like gravitation, or heredity, or the laws of chemistry. But when the older thinkers called the Law of Right and Wrong 'the Law of Nature', they really meant the Law of Human Nature. The idea was that, just as all bodies are governed by the law of gravitation, and organisms by biological laws, so the creature called man also had his law - with this great difference, that a body could not choose whether it obeyed the law of gravitation or not, but a man could choose either to obey the Law of Human Nature or to disobey it.

We may put this in another way. Each man is at every moment subjected to several different sets of law but there is only one of these which he is free to disobey As a body, he is subjected to gravitation and cannot disobey it; if you leave him unsupported in mid-air, he has no more choice about falling than a stone has. As an organism, he is subjected to various biological laws which he cannot disobey any more than an animal can. That is, he cannot disobey those laws which he shares with other things; but the law which is peculiar to his human nature, the law he does not share with animals or vegetables or inorganic things, is the one he can disobey if he chooses.

This law was called the Law of Nature because people thought that every one knew it by nature and did not need to be taught it. They did not mean, of course, that you might not find an odd individual here and there who did not know it, just as you find a few people who are colour-blind or have no ear for a tune. But taking the race as a whole, they thought that the human idea of decent behaviour was obvious to every one. And I believe they were right. If they were not, then all the things we said about the war were nonsense. What was the sense in saying the enemy were in the wrong unless Right is a real thing which the Nazis at bottom knew as well as we did and ought to have practised. If they had had no notion of what we mean by right, then, though we might still have had to fight them, we could no more have blamed them for that than for the colour of their hair.

I know that some people say the idea of a Law of Nature or decent behaviour known to all men is unsound, because different civilisations and different ages have had quite different moralities.

But this is not true. There have been differences between their moralities, but these have never amounted to anything like a total difference. If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of, say, the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, what will really strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own. Some of the evidence for this I have put together in the appendix of another book called The Abolition of Man; but for our present purpose I need only ask the reader to think what a totally different morality would mean. Think of a country where people were admired for running away in battle, or where a man felt proud of double-crossing all the people who had been kindest to him. You might just as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five. Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to - whether it was only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or every one. But they have always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has never been admired. Men have differed as to whether you should have one wife or four. But they have always agreed that you must not simply have any woman you liked.

But the most remarkable thing is this. Whenever you find a man who says he does not believe in a real Right and Wrong, you will find the same man going back on this a moment later. He may break his promise to you, but if you try breaking one to him he will be complaining 'It's not fair' before you can say Jack Robinson. A nation may say treaties don't matter; but then, next minute, they spoil their case by saying that the particular treaty they want to break was an unfair one. But if treaties do not matter, and if there is no such thing as Right and Wrong - in other words, if there is no Law of Nature - what is the difference between a fair treaty and an unfair one? Have they not let the cat out of the bag and shown that, whatever they say, they really know the Law of Nature just like anyone else?

It seems, then, we are forced to believe in a real Right and Wrong. People may be sometimes mistaken about them, just as people sometimes get their sums wrong; but they are not a matter of mere taste and opinion any more than the multiplication table. Now if we are agreed about that, I go on to my next point, which is this. None of us are really keeping the Law of Nature. If there are any exceptions among you, I apologise to them. They had much better read some other book, for nothing I am going to say concerns them. And now, turning to the ordinary human beings who are left:

I hope you will not misunderstand what I am going to say. I am not preaching, and Heaven knows I do not pretend to be better than anyone else. I am only trying to call attention to a fact; the fact that this year, or this month, or, more likely, this very day, we have failed to practise ourselves the kind of behaviour we expect from other people. There may be all sorts of excuses for us. That time you were so unfair to the children was when you were very tired. That slightly shady business about the money - the one you have almost forgotten - came when you were very hard-up. And what you promised to do for old So-and-so and have never done - well, you never would have promised if you had known how frightfully busy you were going to be. And as for your behaviour to your wife (or husband) or sister (or brother) if I knew how irritating they could be, I would not wonder at it - and who the dickens am I, anyway? I am just the same. That is to say, I do not succeed in keeping the Law of Nature very well, and the moment anyone tells me I am not keeping it, there starts up in my mind a string of excuses as long as your arm. The question at the moment is not whether they are good excuses. The point is that they are one more proof of how deeply, whether we like it or not, we believe in the Law of Nature. If we do not believe in decent behaviour, why should we be so anxious to make excuses for not having behaved decently. The truth is, we believe in decency so much - we feel the Rule of Law pressing on us so - that we cannot bear to face the fact that we are breaking it, and consequently we try to shift the responsibility. For you notice that it is only for our bad behaviour that we find all these explanations. It is only our bad temper that we put down to being tired or worried or hungry; we put our good temper down to ourselves.

These, then, are the two points I wanted to make. First, that human beings, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way, and cannot really get rid of it. Secondly, that they do not in fact behave in that way. They know the Law of Nature; they break it. These two facts are the foundation of all clear thinking about ourselves and the universe we live in.

"One man with courage makes a majority." - Andrew Jackson
The HinzSight Report
Race 4 2008

I've read Lewis. A link would have been enough.

Sorry, Dixie, I'm a stickin' to my guns on this. I guess I'm going to have to blog on it to really explain why. But in that whole nature/nurture thing, I come down with nurture.

That is an amazing passage. I am utterly irreligious, but I intend to buy that book tomorrow. Thank you so much for bringing it to my attention.

Presumptuous man! the reason wouldst thou find,
Why formed so weak, so little, and so blind?
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess,
Why formed no weaker, blinder, and no less.

Re: Classical liberals tend to believe in a single universal human nature

I don't think that is true at all. It is a tenet of conservatism that human nature is immutable, at least in regard to historical time. Therefore (given a common origin for humanity) it would impossible for plural human natures to exist.

Certainly it is true for many, though not all. It's true for Locke, for instance. And while Hobbes is not a liberal, it is most certainly true for Hobbes. (See Bk 1 of Leviathan.) It is a thread running through the Federalist Papers, Adam Smith, and many others.

It is not true for totalitarians--Marx, Rousseau, Plato, and Neitzche and their disciples.