More on the "V-shaped things"
By streiff Posted in War — Comments (16) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
"The idea that we're not building new Humvees with the V-shaped things is just crap."
--Joe Biden, defense and public health expert
Unfortunately, Joe. The V-shaped things have to be actually manufactured by real people, in real factories, with real materials. They aren't created by the Legislative FairyWand™ issued to senior senators.
The desire to produce lots of V-shaped things has run head on into reality, a reality which calls into question a central tenet of conservative philosophy: the role of government in industry.
Read on.
But the current rush has been accompanied by criticism that the Pentagon was slow in adopting the technology. A Marine Corps official in Iraq requested more than 1,000 of the vehicles in 2005, but the program was not launched for another year, said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a presidential candidate. The "request got buried for over a year," Biden said. "Imagine if we had started building them in '05? How many lives could we have saved?"
The Marine Corps disputes the charge that it ignored the request. At the time, the vehicle's manufacturers were not capable of producing a large number quickly, said Maj. Jay Delarosa, a Marine Corps spokesman. The Marine Corps opted to buy thousands more of a new version of the armored Humvee, the M1114, instead. At the time, the M1114 was considered the "gold standard" and the MRAP was not as well defined, he said.
"Since the threat has become more lethal, the MRAP . . . defined as we know it in 2007 terms, should be considered as the platinum standard," Delarosa said.
The Marine Corps has issued more than $1 billion in orders for the vehicle, including more than $450 million in contracts awarded last week to International Military and Government, Force Protection Industries and Rockville-based BAE Systems. When the vehicles will begin to arrive in Iraq in large numbers depends on how quickly the industry can ramp up, Delarosa said.
A Defense Contract Management Agency report recently found that contractors might have trouble obtaining thin-gauge armor steel plate, tires, axles and other crucial components, according to a Pentagon statement. Only few plants in North America are capable of making the 3/8 -inch steel needed for the vehicles, the statement said. In an effort to accelerate MRAP production to 1,200 vehicles a month, the Pentagon gave the program a "DX" rating, giving manufacturers special preference in getting access to raw materials.
BAE has received orders for 94 vehicles, which it expects to deliver this summer. But its version of the vehicle requires four to five tons of steel each. The steel usually must be ordered six months in advance, making it difficult to produce them quickly without significant planning, said Matt Riddle, vice president of survivability systems at BAE.
"You want 1,000 vehicles a month, but that's 4,000 tons of steel. The question is, do you have enough industrial capacity?" Riddle said.
We've seen the same problem with building uparmored HMMWV, the kits to uparmor earlier models, the production of body armor, etc. The production of spare parts for military vehicles and aircraft is similarly hampered though the impact hasn't received the attention of the production problems with armor.
The basic problem is this. Prior to 2005 there was no demand for the MRAP, no manufacturing facilities for it, and the plants that produced the required steel did so in sufficient quantities to serve their customers and to keep shareholders happy. Changes in the way autos are manufactured, here I'm not talking about the export of manufacturing facilites overseas, though that is a part, with highly automated production lines and lean staffing prohibit us from surging vehicles into production like we did in World War II. In some cases, we really have no capacity whatsoever. The last M1A2 Abrams tank rolled off the assembly line in 1999. It was essentially a boutique operation with more in common with British Leyland of the 1950s than Detroit. In the seven years it was produced the factory turned out about 627 tanks, less than two per week.
The situation in the military aviation is even more severe. As hard as it is to believe, members of Congress, some allegedly conservative, have actively worked to force Boeing to compete head-to-head for US military business with Airbus, a heavily subsidized foreign manufacturer seemingly oblivious to the danger this poses to our industrial base.
During the Cold War the US government owned a network of Government-Owned-Government-Operated (GOGO) and Government-Owned-Contractor-Operated (GOCO) producing tanks, ammunition, etc. These have mostly been closed or privatized.
Currently military small arms ammunition is produced in exactly one GOCO facility in Lake City, Missouri. It is being strained to keep up with the demand for ammunition for the war as well as for training. Fortunately, there are other sources for small arms ammunition. Take a moment and consider that fact. All small arms ammunition for the US military is produced at a single plant.
As much as the utterance of the phrase "industrial policy" will send many conservatives in search of Holy Water and a crucifix, we have to seriously discuss whether we can afford to have an economy so free of subsidies and government meddling that we lose the ability to manufacture critical military equipment.
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More on the "V-shaped things" 16 Comments (0 topical, 16 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
..... Good conservatives who have supported the Berry amendment for years, precisely because of the concerns about industrial capacity, have always been ridiculed as anti-free trade.
In fact, veto threats have been made to the defense bills over this very issue.
Now, when it comes to MRAP, and there is no possibility that we can even surge the production to get them there quickly, someone finally raises this as an issue.
Thank you.
I can't speak for the Congresscritters you mention (nor would I care to try). But when Airbus competes for civilian business, they are constantly having to answer to: "But you guys are a quasi-government entity. Of course your prices will be lower." Their constantly-voiced rejoinder is "Like h*ll we are! Boeing is every bit as subsidized by the Pentagon as we are by the people of France, Germany and Spain."
I wouldn't be surprised if some of our beloved Congressional overlords are looking for a two-fer: take some of the pressure off a national industrial champion, and kick our national defense in the teeth.
Do subsidies, and state direction of industry more generally, actually succeed in creating the kind of high-quality, efficient, cost-effective industry that we need?
Is the problem here that we're not like Europe, or is the problem that we let President Clinton cut too much of the military budget, thus causing domestic supplies of these materials to dry up with the demand?
I mean sure, for years Democrats claimed that a big defense budget was effectively a subsidy, but were we not actually demanding useful products from all those contractors, in the event of a real war somewhere?
It's never going to happen, but I'm guessing the solution to this is to cut spending on stupid things, quit earmarking the daylights out of the Defense budget so that members of Congress can look like 'distinguished experts' by pushing their pet programs, and simply get more of all the 'little' things that are useful in war, like better cars.
A steady, heightened demand should create an environment friendlier to an steady, heightened supply, no?
Run like Reagan!
....was not so much the problem as it was the decision of the first Bush Administration to take a 'Peace Dividend'.
We had consistently reigned in and had built down the Procurement accounts in the Major Force Programs since 1986 in the Reagan Administration. Clinton simply accelerated it... We were headed in that direction anyway and knew it before Gulf I even bagan. The Consolidation of industry had started.
In any circumstance, the O&M costs were accelerating too on the Reagan era equipment.
The emphasis on RDT&E has always been a Republican thing, and we did not surge the right amount of $$$ into the Rrocurement accounts at the biginning of W's admin.
It was fairly well documented that we needed $100 billion more added to the current force at the beginning of this administration simply to level load it, and we did not do that.
Yes, Bush added $100 billion, but nowhere near enough went to the current force to maintain O&M and readiness availabilities. A LOT went to Missile Defense, and that WAS needed. But we needed a lot more for the current force.
...my spelling in the previous post of mine..... My keyboard is on the fritz.
Like oil and water.
Some serious questions raised here, streiff. But of course, neither the media nor the Democrats (but I repeat myself) are equipped to even discuss them.
"No compromise with the main purpose, no peace till victory, no pact with unrepentant wrong." - Winston Churchill
I don't see this as a reflection of "industrial policy" or lack thereof. I see this as a reflection of the insidiousness of Congress's lacksadasical attitude about our military. With the appropriate requirements for security at the agencies, I believe our free market system can outperform any congressionally mandated industrial policy. But when congress looks first to the military budget to balance their subsidies for bad behavior, neither an industrial nor a free market economy can produce sufficient materials to wage war.
In fact since I rent from someone who works as a Navy civilian employee and frequently visits a couple of the shipyards, I would say that the our current policies here look so much like a socialist "industrial policy" as to be indistinguishable from socialism, and which expectedly leaves competent people foaming at the mouth about how incompetent are the money grubbers who run some of these shows are. While I can't get into the particulars, the roomate has consistent horror stories about a key component for some of the boats that is as difficult to get as the steel for the humvees, with a similar lead time, and only one manufacturer for the material in the U.S. Yet the builder can't seem to order from the contractor with sufficient lead time so the materials are available when needed, and therefore consistently requests waivers for supplies that might be okay, but which are outside the shelf-life for the official spec. Good to know they have the safety of our military volunteeers at heart.
as a huge pork opportunity? I'd say the Dems are worse about it, but both parties do it.
The whole idea behind BRAC is that you could never trust a politician to allow any closure or reduction at a base in his her district/state regardless of what made sense from a military readiness POV.
It's the same thing when it comes to defense procurement activities. Politicians' primary interest is in getting those dollars and jobs into their district/state regardless of what makes sense from a military POV.
or more accurately as a reflection of a terror of the idea of industrial policy.
Does it make sense, from an industrial base standpoint, that we haven't produced a tank in 8 years? That we have one ammunition plant? That we have to worry about finding 4K tons of specialty steel? That we only have a couple of assembly lines for fighters and we haven't built a bomber since July 2000?
Your case about naval shipbuilding actually points to an inadvertent success of industrial policy cleverly disguised as earmarks. We have two shipyards capable of building naval surface combatants. Only one of those can build a nuclear carrier. Realistically, the Navy's shipbuilding program could be handled entirely in Norfolk. But if we ever wanted to go back to the days of a 600 ship Navy we simply couldn't build those ships in any reasonable amount of time because of the lack of infrastructure. The absence of a shipbuilding facility on the West Coast is also inexplicable from a strategic standpoint.
"A man can never have too much red wine, too many books, or too much ammunition." -- Rudyard Kipling
When you say "industrial policy" I think of something mandated congress in a merchantilistic fashion, only under the guise of national defense. If what you mean is that Congress conistently allocates money to build the resources, with competitive bidding by a free market (within constraints so that security requirements are met) then we are in agreement. But if you mean the latter, then no. Because in a competive environment with a predictable money flow, we'll get better equipment for less cost and build a more diverse base from which to bid.
And no, realistically Norfolk couldn't handle all the ship building. They have a different set of quality problems than say, Electric Boat, but they both abuse the system because the Navy can't realistically go elsewhere to have the work done. That goes away if you have a sufficiently large and diverse base from which to chose your builders and suppliers. What keeps killing the efficiency is all the single source suppliers. The paint crew won't have dirty and greasy underlayers at EB if they know that means the next contract will go to the new Miami shipyard.
Furthermore, having a single location for building makes no strategic sense: Take out that one site and you cripple the Navy and Marines. While the Airforce and Army can compensate, they can't replace the Navy and the Marines.
I agree with all your points about too few production facilities, I just don't think a Congressionally mandated production solution will fix it. Setting appropriate, consistent FUNDING for it will. And the consistent is almost as important as the appropriate. Businesses can't have their cash flow seesawing back and forth at Congress's whim. I think that's a large part of the reason for the dearth of competition now: Why should I risk the capital to build a facility if I'm reasonably certain Congress will defund the program before I can recoup my investment?
but this is also the problem:
And no, realistically Norfolk couldn't handle all the ship building. They have a different set of quality problems than say, Electric Boat, but they both abuse the system because the Navy can't realistically go elsewhere to have the work done. That goes away if you have a sufficiently large and diverse base from which to chose your builders and suppliers.
If you look at Navy shipbuilding the past two decades and what NS&D was kicking out in its heyday, Norfolk could build every surface combatant alone.
But to the point. The only way you are going to maintain a large base of suppliers is with a large demand. This means you are going to be building ships that go directly into mothballs. If you only build to peacetime demand, guaranteed funding or no, you only have need for one or two shipbuilding facilities.
So we're straight on terminology.
"A man can never have too much red wine, too many books, or too much ammunition." -- Rudyard Kipling
.... Is a dream. We couldn't even get back the CNO certified 375 ship requirement from 2001 in 30 years.
Look at the Defense Authorization Act with respect to the 30 year shipbuilding program that required CNO delivery. It only gets us to 296 ships by the year 2036.
Further to that, if we doubled the budget and drove up capacity, we lack the welders and pipefitters to accelerate the process. When we lay off one third of the workforce every few years, we buy them back at higher and higher prices after the employment bathtub ends.
It's a nightmare. We are consciously headed the way of the British Navy.
1) The 1974 Budget act reigns in deviation from the PRESBUD in a large way to game it against doing very much without destroying the Administrations other priorities. Perhaps the Administration should put forward a budget that actually changes the dynamic in what they budget for military vs. domestic discretionary. The impact on the 302(1) and 302(b) allocations would be almost immediate.
2) Yeah, let me tell you about shipyards. The author of this is absolutely correct. The long lead times for shipyards, particularly for specialty materials, is a real problem. The contractor as a GOCO relies on approps. However, the only way to solve this is ADVANCE APPROPRIATIONS, which BOTH the ADMINISTRATION and the RSC oppose. Or, perhaps, we could move to biennial budgeting. But that's also opposed.
If the administration had it their way, Berry would just be waived. In fact, I remember back to early in 2001/2002 when the DASD for industrial policy wanted to outsource some of our shipbuilds to China.
Industrial capacity is a VERY REAL problem when it comes to the military.
As a proud former memeber of the Army, I am well aware of the Army's aversion (rightly or wrongly) to doing things like peace keeping and nationbuilding. It was this aversion during the 90s and early part of OIF that lead the Army to realize that it needed a seperate fleet of armored wheeled vehicles to outfit entire corps, not just a few brigades. Had they realized that low intensity conflicts requiring wheeled vehciles as opposed to tracked vehicles were the wave of the future, they could have planned and budgeted for a multi year procurrment process that wouldn't have overwhelmed our current infastructure.
and just a small footnote of my own; reducing the ability of our military to rely on domestic industrial sources is short sighted and dangerous. If we can't spend money domestically and rely on an uninteruppted supply chain for our common defense, this country is unquestionably more vulnerable.
Make no mistake, I have no love loss for those who overcharge and effectively steal from American's. But where does it make sense to seek a solution from foreign suppliers providing a more vulnerable supply chain subsidized by their governments. What's next: bullets made in Venezuela to save a few bucks? Truly ridiculous.
Oh, and Biden's defense is he only read the Cliff Notes.
"Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori"
Contributor to The Minority Report
Theres a great Dilbert strip that ends with the pointy haired boss saying "If I don't understand it, it must be simple"
I think we have some very pointy haired congress critters.
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"Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it."
-Thomas Paine: The American Crisis, No. 4, 1777