The disengagement
By tacitus Posted in War — Comments (23) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
Ed. note: This is part one of a two-part piece.
In case you've not been paying attention, the Sadrist revolt in Iraq is
href="http://nytimes.com/2004/08/06/international/middleeast/06CND-IRAQ.html?hp">back in full swing href="http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2004/WORLD/meast/01/29/sprj.nirq.prison/long.sadr.jpg">Cherub-faced href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3131330.stm">Moqtada al-Sadr href="http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0715/p01s04-woiq.html">with Iranian help
And he used them to recruit, having lost a few thousand of his fanatics in the spring battles: survival being victory when it comes to fighting Americans, he was able to present himself as a winner to the credulous masses. Now, once more, they are out for mayhem in the streets of south and central Iraq, joining Fallujah's shameful example in demonstrating that there is never an upside to strategic or operational restraint with violent Islamists. They are fighting the Americans (and getting
href="http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=5900227">slaughtered by the hundreds href="http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=560820 §ion=news">fighting the British href="http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=5891745">fighting the Italians href="http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/iraq/20040805-0846-iraq.html">fighting the Iraqis href="http://www.juancole.com/2004_08_01_juancole_archive.html#109180648565947808"> Juan Cole href="http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3582685&reportid=562588&th esection=news&thesubsection=world">making noises href="http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/la-fg-iraq6aug06,1,5597306.story ?coll=la-home-headlines">iron fist
Iraqi officials said Thursday that they were not interested in trying to make deals with Sadr.
"We are not going to negotiate," Interior Minister Falah Nakib said at an afternoon news conference in Baghdad. "We are going to fight this militia. We have enough power and strength to kick those people out."
Asked whether he had a message for Sadr, Nakib replied, "Don't kill yourself."
Watch these events: They are bellwethers not only for the new Iraqi government, but for the future of the war itself. Lest we forget, these battles come even as the de facto spiritual leader of Iraq's Shi'a, the
href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3033306.stm">Ayatollah Sistani href="http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-iraq-sistani.html" >travels to Britain href="http://www.sistani.org/html/eng/menu/3/inside/18.htm">najis
Why, you ask, is this on Red State, and what has it to do with American politics? Read on.
The obvious connection with American politics is of course its effect on the
President's reelection campaign. Now, I'll fess up: I'm a supporter of the war.
I'm not much of a supporter of the way the war has been waged, and even less
of a supporter of the way it's been sold to the American public. (Call me, if you
wish, a penny-ante
href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1594200130/qid=1091825414/sr=8- 1/ref=pd_ka_1/102-9926573-8784911?v=glance&s=books&n=507846">Niall Ferguson
such matters.) The decision to go to war was bold and decisive; the subsequent
political management of the war has been markedly less so. The reason for this
failing, as far as can be discerned, is that Administration appears to buy into the
myth of American casualty-phobia. But myths are, well, myths. As Victor Davis
Hanson (to name only the latest of a long line of scholars of history) has noted,
democracies are well-suited for the waging of long, bloody wars given adequate
leadership and motivation. Defeat typically comes when the political classes
lose heart: and that is almost always long before the people as a whole do. Look,
for example, to the two modern events cited as supporting evidence for this myth:
Beirut 1983 and Mogadishu 1993. The story goes that the American public, scarred
by televised images of bloodied sons in battle, withdrew its support for both
ventures, and the men in the field soon withdrew in turn. Lawrence Kaplan
href="http://www.keepmedia.com/Register.do?oliID=225">demolishes
in an apt and too-little known piece in TNR.
In Lebanon, for example, public support for the U.S. intervention
increased after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. But,
when President Reagan backed away from the operation, that support evaporated.
Similarly, when 18 Rangers were killed in Mogadishu, NBC, ABC, and CNN polls found
that 61, 56, and 55 percent, respectively, favored sending more troops to Somalia.
That support, too, disappeared as it became clear the president himself no longer
backed the mission.
In an election season, then, in which the President presumably wants the Iraq war
off the nightly news, the lesson here is that the American people will not hold the
war against him so long as he is resolute and clearly intent upon decisive victory.
This is still possible: see Falah Nakib above.
The import of the Iraq war and the latest phase of combat does not begin nor end
with President Bush. This war is one of many things that John Kerry hopes to
inherit in January, and so it's worth examining his thoughts and plans on the
subject. He's been famously inconsistent on the former (for, against, for,
against, according to the political winds), and famously reticent on the latter --
see his insistence hitherto upon the electorate's belief in his
href="http://www.redstate.org/story/2004/7/19/21191/4491">secret plan
things in Iraq right. Hitherto, because as the Kerry campaign festers on,
it's becoming increasingly clear just what the secret plan actually is. The signs
are, to say the least, profoundly disturbing.
Sometimes you'll hear things that are so out of left field, so unexpected, or so
troubling that you don't register them at first. Only later, be it seconds or
days, do you recall the words with a flicker of surprised recognition. Such was my
reaction to yesterday's
href="http://www.npr.org/features/feature.php?wfId=3822655">interview
John Kerry, John Edwards, and NPR's Steve Inskeep. (Realaudio stream
href="rtsp://real.npr.na-central.speedera.net/real.npr.na-central/me/20040806_me_09 .rm">here
going through this piece by piece, not in the spirit of "fisking," which tends to
promote shoddy writing and thinking in equal measure, but with the intent to parse.
We'll return to a synthesis and conclusion at the end.
The section of the interview we're interested in begins at roughly 3 minutes, 45
seconds into the audio stream:
Inskeep: Moving on to another subject, now -- Iraq. You have
said that you would try harder to bring in America's allies. But, that said, if
you look ahead a year, two years, if you win this election, how is the situation on
the ground in Iraq going to be any different than it is now?
Kerry: Well, it has to be different from the way it is now. It is not safe
today. It is not working for Iraqis. I believe it is critical to our success to
have a fresh start. This President, regrettably, rushed to war, without a plan to
win the peace, he pushed our allies aside, we've lost our credibility with the
world, we need to restore that. And I think I can do that.
Inskeep: This is what I'm wondering, though: In a year from now, since you
do want to remain committed to Iraq, isn't it the case that there will still be
many, many thousands of American troops there, still fighting the insurgents if the
insurgents want to fight?
Kerry: Ah, no, not necessarily at all, because I think our diplomacy can
produce a very different ingredient on the ground. And if it can't produce a
different ingredient on the ground, lemme tell you something, that says something
about what Iraqis want, and what the people in the region want. I believe that
within a year from now, we could significantly reduce American forces in Iraq.
And, ah, that's my plan.
What do we take away from this? John Kerry asserts that diplomacy will change
things in Iraq. John Kerry allows that diplomacy may not change things in Iraq.
John Kerry refers to the requisite transformative diplomacy in the context of
diplomacy within Iraq and the region. It is this diplomacy that he
expects to bring American troops home. Let's move on:
Inskeep: A year from right now?
Kerry: Absolutely we could reduce the numbers. You bet.
Edwards: Can I just add to what John's saying? What he's describing just
creates an entirely new dynamic. These are not abstract concepts -- he's really
thought this through. For example, bringing in NATO, and having a new President, a
fresh start, dealing with the international community, can convert this from an
American occupation to an international presence helping the Iraqis provide for
their own security. So, a year from now, which is what you're asking about....
Inskeep: Sure.
Edwards: ....We could have a completely different dynamic than what we have
today in Iraq.
Herein we see more of the mythmaking that drives modern Democrats. Elections they
lose are stolen. Those who voted for this war don't include them.
Nato is not
href="http://www.boston.com/dailynews/220/world/NATO_sends_officers_to_Iraq_fo:.sht ml">involved in Iraq
Viz., British and Italians fighting and dying as you read this; linked above. The
strategy of "helping the Iraqis provide for their own security" does not
presently exist. Viz., our Iraqi allies fighting and dying as you read this;
linked above.
And the greatest myth of all: that the sine qua non of any improvement is a
President John F. Kerry. The man who would be him speaks on:
Kerry: Let me give an example. If I get other countries
involved in the training of troops, and we're training them more rapidly, the
Iraqis themselves can take over a great deal more of their own security. But you
need stability to be able to do that. How do you achieve the stability? You need
to have more people involved in the process. We have not seen this Administration
do the statesmanship, do the diplomacy necessary, and America is paying a very high
price both in terms of the lives of our young, and the money that's coming out of
the taxpayer's pockets. I will do a better job of building those alliances and
getting our troops home. And I will do a much better job of reducing the burden on
the National Guard and Reserves and their families who are paying a very high price
for the President's rush.
But we've already seen, other countries are involved in the training of
troops. And is it not something of a poor plan that depends wholly upon the
unproven and historically untrustworthy goodwill and independent volition of other
nations? In his acceptance speech at the DNC, Kerry vowed: "I will never give any
nation or international institution a veto over our national security." And yet,
his plan of action here does just that: indeed, it is premised upon those nations
whom he assumes will treat him well not exercising that veto.
And if they do? If the hope-and-pray option doesn't work? What then? John Kerry
does not say. Indeed, like the neocon ideologues he decries, it does not appear to
occur to him that Option A may fail. And like them, he will proceed with the intended consequence of Option A even in its absence.
Inskeep: Regarding the effort to reduce the burden on the
National Guard -- you've promised there will be an additional 40,000 US troops.
You've said --
Kerry: Active duty. Not in Iraq.
Inskeep: -- and you want to double the size of the Special Forces.
Kerry: Yes.
Inskeep: Given that it will take some time to build up those forces --
Kerry: Yes it will.
Inskeep: -- and given that you want to reduce the number of US troops in
Iraq rather quickly, within a few months after assuming office --
Kerry: Well, those are two different situations.
Inskeep: Well, I want to know -- the question is, I want to know where are
you intending for those troops to be used?
Kerry: We have huge obligations around the world still. North Korea ... we
have Europe ... uh, Bosnia, Kosovo. We're not even doing what we probably ought to
be doing in Darfur, in Africa. This Administration never responded fast enough to
Liberia because of how overextended we are. So I believe --
Edwards: And reducing the burden on our Reserves and our Guard.
Kerry: -- the way you do it is by getting those active duty in place over a
period of time. Now, ultimately, I want to reduce the size. I want to reduce the
deployments. And if we have the proper effort over the next few years, my vision
with respect to North Korea, and our presence in Europe, if the European defense
force emerges, as they are talking of it, we can begin really bring some of
America's troops home and begin to reduce our overall military burden. But for the
moment, for this moment in time, we need these extra personnel.
Inskeep: Senators John Kerry and John Edwards, thanks very
much.
We have already here
noted the Kerry plan,
href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A58293-20 04Jan28¬Found=true">cribbed
increase of 40,000 men in our armed forces (presumably meant for the Army). Now we
see that even though those men are meant to compensate for a shortfall in wartime,
they will not be sent to the actual theater of war. (Let us note, by the
bye, that both Rumsfeld's actual 30,000 and Kerry's imaginary 40,000 are both
insufficient to truly cover the shortfalls at hand.) One might rightly ask whether
they will free up other soldiers to go to war themselves; one would then have to
note that this would involve both a rupture in the Army's current standards of
enlistment -- by which you are, ultimately, sent wherever the Army pleases -- and a
negation of John Kerry's own obvious dogged determination to reduce troop levels in
Iraq no matter what.
And it's not just in Iraq -- he envisions a reduction of American military
commitments abroad in all theaters. Kerry simultaneously reproaches the
Bush Administration for not getting militarily involved in more operational
theaters -- Liberia, Darfur -- and speaks of a desire to withdraw around the world.
It is a desire so strong that he is already mentally offloading strategic
responsibilities to entities, like the pan-European defense force, that do not
exist in any meaningful form. It is a desire so strong that he is quite
obviously prepared do to it no matter what.
Think about that last bit. Think back to the interview excerpt's beginning. John
Kerry avers that "diplomacy" can secure a peace or stability of sorts from groups
and peoples with whom we are at war and whom we have yet to defeat.
This, he asserts, will create the conditions for troop withdrawals. Oh, and if it
doesn't? Because it won't: "[I]f it can't produce a different ingredient on the
ground, lemme tell you something, that says something about what Iraqis want, and
what the people in the region want." The rhetorical ground is prepared. The
will-of-the-people rhetoric is deployed. The stage for the grim, resolute,
yielding-to-reality (so unlike those neocons!) President John F. Kerry is set.
Remember: if every best-case scenario for withdrawal doesn't work; if diplomacy(!)
mysteriously fails to sway murderous fanatics to goodwill; if the French don't
abruptly dispatch the Foreign Legion to Anbar Province; and if big-hearted
Europeans don't immediately begin training thousands of Jeffersonian-minded Iraqis
-- in short, if there's still a war to be won:
He's going to withdraw anyway.
Remember. Mark it well. He's going to withdraw anyway. His plan, such as
it is, and predicated entirely upon third parties acting just so, could not
work at all: and he will withdraw. Beyond Iraq, we are enmeshed in a titanic,
global war on terror: and he speaks of withdrawing from every corner of that globe.
It's not a strategy motivated by careful thought or the nuance for which he is so
justly famous. It's an idee fixe. It is retreat and retrenchment as ends in
themselves. It is an abdication of the American role in the world not seen since
the bitter days of the 1970s. I said before that it took me some time to process
the import of Kerry's words in this interview. I drove on to work, and I sat and
thought it through. And then I typed the transcript out. And then I realized just
what the man is proposing to do.
He's going to withdraw anyway.
John Kerry vaulted into public life on the bloodied backs of the millions of
slaughtered, enslaved and expelled Indochinese who suffered their fates -- and
still suffer their fates -- because he and those like him achieved their
policy victories back in those aforementioned bitter days. One might expect
lessons learned from the experience: some measure of empathy or compassion for the
victims deprived of the shield of American might and ideals. It was, after all,
not merely the only thing keeping them somewhat free: it was the only thing keeping
a few millions of them alive. But it seems he has learned precisely
nothing. Now, three decades later, in Iraq and around the world there is another
bitter fight -- and there is the same instinct to cut and run, dressed up in
fantastical hypotheticals and dronings-on about priorities. What man wishes to be
President of the United States, even as he wishes to not win its wars? The
names McClellan, McGovern, Debs, and Thomas spring to mind.
He's going to withdraw anyway.
I've had my profound problems with George W. Bush's handling of Iraq. His
strategic management has been uneven; his assessment of his generals has been often
lacking; and his direction of certain battles -- Fallujah most glaringly -- skirts
catastrophe. But I rest assured that he will not countenance the greatest
catastrophe of all: defeat. Whatever his flaws, the President will see the Iraq
war through. We can ask no less of a leader entrusted with our nation's honor and
future.
John Kerry, by contrast, is planning to abandon that nation and its people. He is planning to allow, if he must, the enemies who massacred Americans in the clear fall skies of three years past to win in Iraq. He is planning to negate and nullify and heroic sacrifices of our Marines and our allies as they crush Islamism in Najaf. He is planning to blame it on events beyond his control: the international community; the current President; the will of the Iraqi people; the realities of resources, of finances, of logistics. Why, after all, close firehouses in Brooklyn yet open them in Baghdad? Callow rhetoric to prepare for callow defeat. The conclusion is that inescapable. And it's that simple.
He's going to withdraw anyway. And the price will be paid in blood.
Go to part two.
« We need more COIN in the Afghan realm — Comments (0) | Cool Unreason — Comments (65) »
The disengagement 23 Comments (0 topical, 23 editorial, 0 hidden) Post a comment »
to the question:
If you were given the same information Bush was given, and in the same exact position as Bush, would you have gone to war in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein?
Kerry has waffled on this question and not answered it straight, even with 18 months to think about.
One only needs to review his positions on Cuba and Nicaragua to see his failed realpolitik calculations. Hence, his idiotic dependence on diplomacy.
Kerry was pals with North Vietnamese Communists, then with Danny Ortega and Nigaruaguan Communists. He has been an extreme leftist on defense matters. In fact, what is interesting is how he is not running on his weak-on-defense dovish record.
The stakes in Iraq are incredibly high. Osama's greatest fear is that Iraq might become another Turkey. Democratic or not, Iraq must be nominally secular and nominally western in orientation. This would be perceived as a great blow against the mullahs and shariah.
It is perfectly clear, from the universal condemnation and hatred by Iraqis for terrorist attacks, that if Iraqi civil society takes root, that country would be our strongest ally against terrorism in the region. It is heartbreaking, but Iraq has faced the equivalent of 9/11 with the bombings in their country. The terrorists want desperately to stop our progress in Iraq.
With Al Qaeda and other terrorists there, ONE
WOULD BE A FOOL TO NOT SEE THAT SECURING IRAQ'S FUTURE IS KEY TO WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR.
It is unthinkable to allow the fundamentalists even a pyrhhic victory in Najaf. It would also be extremely significant if the Iraqis were perceived as the force to put down Sadr.
The reality is that Iraqi police did do a lot of good work fighting back in Najaf and they rounded up 1000 (!!!!) fighters. Iraqi police + coalition
fighters have given al-Sadr a second butt-kicking and he cried uncle. Now that we are dividing and conquering various insurgents ... the amnesty law is a case in point. Read the fine print, and it is NOT AN AMNESTY FOR TERRORISTS - it is an amnesty for the 'helpers' who help store weapons, give information or collaborate and break minor crimes - bombers, rapists, arsonists, and killers are not forgiven. To get amnesty, they have to COME FORWARD AND GIVE INFORMATION. This amnesty is a brilliant move to bring in the 'small fish' in the 'resistance' groups and that further isolates the few terrorists from civil society and tightens the noose on them.
It is far more certian now than even 5 weeks ago that WE ARE WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR.
I'll write more on it here:
Digging through Kerry's rhetoric takes time and a strong stomach, but I caught the gist of the " he's going withdraw anyway" because he already has his excuse readied
Ah, no, not necessarily at all, because I think our diplomacy can produce a very different ingredient on the ground. And if it can't produce a different ingredient on the ground, lemme tell you something, that says something about what Iraqis want, and what the people in the region want.
IMO, this is just a variation on the theme we've heard ad nauseam from the usual suspects "if Iraqis really wanted Saddam gone, they would have gotten rid of him themselves." Kerry's rationale is going to be, if insurgents are still bombing, murdering, terrorizing etc then it's because that what the Iraqis really want.
And, of course, any further bloodshed in Iraq will not be Kerry's fault at all, but GW's.
Mike paid me the enormous compliment of calling one of my posts the best yet on Redstate. Insofar as he was right -- and I submit that, with thanks, he was not -- the facts have overtaken that assertion.
One presumes you read one of Paul's Epistles before writing this.
"Defeat typically comes when the political classes lose heart: and that is almost always long before the people as a whole do."
I am a Dem who will vote for the guy who promises to fight to win. Nothing less. Nothing pretty. In Fallujah, in Najaf.
Win. Now.
You're very right about this point. In fact, it's worth noting that, prior to pledging to reduce the American military presence, NATO agreed -- over French opposition -- that it would dispatch officers for Iraqi security training. One wonders whether this development may have assured Kerry's campaign that it could come out on this position.
In response to Inskeep's followup question, if I may paraphrase: Kerry claims to be committed to the war in Iraq, but won't there still be thousands of our troops there fighting the insurgents a year from now?
"Ah, no, not necessarily at all, because I think our diplomacy can produce a very different ingredient on the ground. And if it can't produce a different ingredient on the ground, lemme tell you something, that says something about what Iraqis want, and what the people in the region want. I believe that within a year from now, we could significantly reduce American forces in Iraq. And, ah, that's my plan."
When I heard and read this, I knew: This man is much worse than I ever thought. A scaling back, yes. A limpwristed approach, yes. But I never thought that John Kerry, a US Senator, would be willing to abandon the field to the enemy, would be willing to leave the vast majority of the Iraqi people to the domination of the "insurgents" - read: Islamist terrorists and petty warlords.
We'll send over some diplomats. They won't listen. And President Kerry would take that as a symbol that the people in Iraq and in the region want the terrorists in control.
This election just became a lot more important to me.
One problem with an all-out attack on the Mahdi Army was that it might endanger the life of, or meet opposition from, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. He was therefore spirited out of Najaf on the pretext that he had heart problems. But Al-Zaman reports today that Sistani stopped off in Beirut on his way to London, where he met with moderate Shiite leader Nabih Berri of the AMAL party, who serves as Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. Sistani then went on to London, but is not in hospital and won't be for at least a week. This story just does not square with him being so ill that he had to be airlifted to London for emergency heart treatment. It would not have been easy for al-Zurufi and the Americans to convince Sistani to leave, but they could have simply shared with him their plans to have an all-out war in Najaf, and told him they could not protect him. That would have left him no choice but to leave. If you think about it, he could not possibly have been gotten out of Najaf to Beirut and London without US military assistance, though he flew a private plane from Baghdad airport.
-- Juan Cole
I have no idea what to make of that.
He has it backwards.
The goal should be victory: Victory defined as a stable and democratic Iraq at peace at home and at peace with its neighbors. This is not only achievable, we are winning in Iraq and reaching that goal. Sure terrorists are trying to stop that but ... earth to Kerry: there's a war on terror on, and this is part of it!!
Kerry instead wants the 'bug-out' approach like he proposed in Vietnam. Reduce our commitment, whether it means Iraq is a democracy or a big mess. This puts the cart before the horse and gives all incentive to our enemies to 'hold on' until our commitment flags.
.... here's what he is aiming for:
So he may have felt he was in some danger. Even if he didnt need treatment, it may have been that the stress of being there was affecting his health, so there was some truth to the story.
"There are many rumors about Sistani's trip to London. Some people believe it's part of a conspiracy aimed at isolating Sadr from Sistani and depriving him of any possible support although it's a well known fact that Sistani doesn't support Sadr at all and that Sadr had surrounded Sistani's house soon after the war and asked him to leave Iraq. Other people say that Sadr deputies had visited Sistani lately and had asked him to declare Jihad but Sistani, as expected refuse strongly which lead to those men threatining to kill him! So they think that the government arranged for his departure for a while to protect him until dealing with Sadr permanently."
http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com
See also my blog on this:
He doesn't even pay attention to the news that comes from there. Why else is he ignoring the role of the Iraqi Police today? He doesn't care about what happens. He'll cut and run from Iraq if he is elected President. Power is all he wants.
I made the same call several weeks ago, and with far fewer words!
:-)
Power is all he wants
Well, I don't think that. I have no doubt as to John Kerry's good intentions; I just don't agree with his policies...and now I'm also worried about what he's going to do in Iraq.
I can't help thinking that Kerry thinks he has a special "in" with Iran, maybe, who knows, even with Syria. It wouldn't be the first time in his life that he was in contact with a foreign government at odds with the US. If Iran is funding &/or supplying resources or men to help the insurgency, & if Kerry can strike a deal with Iran, then, presto -- or that would be the idea for Kerry, anyway. If Kerry has had some sort of secret discussions, directly or through intermediaries, with the Iranian government, then he is their useful idiot.
Kerry: "...I think our diplomacy can produce a very different ingredient on the ground. And if it can't produce a different ingredient on the ground, lemme tell you something, that says something about what Iraqis want, and what the people in the region want." [emphasis added]
I linked to Tacitus' article from the blog article here ... and added a bonus, some added points and nice PoliPundit graphic that 'says it all':
Liberating Iraq blog:
http://freedomstruth.blogspot.com/
What I find astonishing is the idea that Kerry could talk other nations into committing large numbers of soldiers to Iraq in order for America to leave. Does that strike anyone else as utterly strange?
Then there's the fact that just about nobody else HAS the requisite forces to replace American soldiers. Most other NATO militaries have severely reduced the size, quality and funding of their militaries. Seriously. If you were to combine all the non-NATO forces together you'd have little more than a few divisions.
Not nearly enough to replace the forces currently in place. Even if you could acquire enough combat infantry to replace American combat infantry, there's the problem of logistics. Nobody else in NATO has the ability to transport or supply forces in Iraq. At the very least this would require a very large contingent just to keep the NATO forces supplied.
There's literally no easy way to leave and still have a viable Iraq. The only way would be to quickly run to the ports, load up everything and then leave.
And I really hate saying that, because the consequences of Tacitus's predictions coming true are so terrifying.
This post was so superb, so well thought out, that I'm making it my feature of the day on me blog:
http://section9.blogspot.com/2004/08/post-of-day-from-tacitus.html
Superb, and well written at that. I suspect that you really didn't want to come to the conclusion that Kerry is a jumped-up version of Tardy George McClellan, but there you have it.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
Some obvious follow-up questions for Kerry/Edwards that never seem to be asked:
K/E: "he pushed our allies aside ... bringing in NATO ... get other countries involved in the training of troops"
Q: Which allies, specifically, were pushed aside? Which NATO countries not currently involved in Iraq are you planning to bring in? What, in terms of the security treaty, is the interest of NATO in Iraq? Do you mena to evoke the mutual defense provision?
K/E: "convert this from an American occupation to an international presence helping the Iraqis provide for their own security"
Q: By this, do you mean a greater parity in presence between the US and allies? If so, do you see this parity being achieved by increasing non-US troop levels, decreasing US-troop levels or a bit of both? What do you think the desired total troop level is and what is your desired balance between US and non-US presence?
K/E: "We have huge obligations around the world still. North Korea ... we have Europe ... uh, Bosnia, Kosovo. "
Q: Are you saying that it is, in your evaluation, more important to withdraw US forces from democracy building in Iraq in favor of sending to Bosnia to continue an effort over five years old? How would you respond to the charge that such a plan would likely produce two long-running efforts that will continue to drain resources with little demonstrable results?
This last statement better demonstrates Kerry's old-think mentality, concentrating on static Euro-centric treaties and methodolgies. The most damning charge I've seen against the Bush administration is a lack of innovative thought in prosecuting a new type of war in an ever changing battleground. What Kerry proposes is akin to a return to the Maginot line.
I'll admit to being frankly alarmed at Kerry's rhetoric on Iraq. This is quite a convincing post, and the only thing allowing me to hold on to hope for this guy is that the remarks are off the cuff, and his 'secret plan' hasn't yet been announced. At the moment you're extrapolating doom from fairly innocuous quotes.
Tell you what - when Kerry finally announces his Iraq plan, if it does turn out to be 'withdraw no matter what' then Democrats should join the mighty GOP mud machine in slapping him down hard.
If he gets elected and starts this withdrawal business, then we all have to join together in telling him how important victory in Iraq is.
One poll question I haven't seen that I would really like to see:
"Is it important for America to achieve victory in Iraq?"
with internals on the democracy question, the presidential fitness question, etc.
Kerry lives in the dreamworld of detente. One only needs to review his positions on Cuba and Nicaragua to see his failed realpolitik calculations. Hence, his idiotic dependence on diplomacy. The peace cannot be won in Iraq (or anyplace else) without the might of the US military. NATO is a facade. The UN is corrupt and completely dysfunctional.
The stakes in Iraq are incredibly high. Osama's greatest fear is that Iraq might become another Turkey. Democratic or not, Iraq must be nominally secular and nominally western in orientation. This would be perceived as a great blow against the mullahs and shariah. It is unthinkable to allow the fundamentalists even a pyrhhic victory in Najaf. It would also be extremely significant if the Iraqis were perceived as the force to put down Sadr.