Paris Burning: Attrition
By Steven Den Beste Posted in User Blogs — Comments (18) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
What is going to bring the riots to an end? It may be attrition.
In war, a casualty is any person in your force who can no longer perform his
duties. Killed and wounded are casualties. People who become sick are
casualties, and historically soldiers were far more likely to die of
disease than to die as a result of enemy action.
Prisoners taken by the other side are also casualties. In the riots in
France, the rioters are suffering immense numbers of casualties, because the
French police are arresting hundreds of rioters per night. A lot of those will
eventually walk for lack of evidence to try them, but only after the riots have
ended. In the mean time they're out of circulation, and the forces of the
rioters have to come up with new recruits to replace them if they want to keep
their force adequate to continue the campaign. (Looking at this from a purely
military point of view.)
For the moment they've been doing that mainly by inflaming other
neighborhoods. But in the original cités where the rioting started, it's dying
out now, and I suspect the primary reason is attrition. The arrests have taken
their toll, and the rioters are no longer of making good their losses through
new recruiting.
In the long run, that's probably how the French authorities will win this
fight: through attrition war. French forces are also suffering casualties, mostly
wounded, but nothing like as heavily. And if the police numbers
can't be maintained, the French army can be used. In the long run, attrition
will hurt the rioters much worse than the French forces.
UPDATE: There's a rather frightening map here.
Attrition will take its' toll, of course. But there are also new rioters taking to the front lines every day. Originally, it was only the extremely bold that took to the streets. But as time passed and France has not responded, the more hesitant have joined the fray.
Also, it's becoming a meme, that there are no consequences to these actions. Notice that the story is being pushed back further and further on the news; it's becoming accepted rather than exceptional.
Will it peter out? France has a history of ruthlessly shutting down insurrection. They have the physical ability to do so; the question is whether they have the will to. At the moment, the fact that de Villepen and Sarkozy are spending more time jockeying for political position in this rather than addressing the basic problem tells me that they aren't.
The question is whether they can shut it down before a flashpoint (police death, rioter death, some attrocity) galvanizes the undecided majority of the country.
It will calm down eventually, but the root causes will remain. And to change those, France would have to become a more dynamic, less socialist state than it is.
When it was convenient to let in all those Algerians (who hated their masters to begin with), France did so and even built concrete stalls for them -- out of the way of course -- so they'd have "lodgings" while working in manufacturing. Now, that sector of the economy has dried up and additionally, the immigrant population has increased, whilst never not becoming "immigrant."
Next time it will be bigger, uglier, and it will quickly break out of the ghetto. Unless France, in the meantime, plans for the next one via "natural" road blocks and shut down of public transportation at the first sign of fire.
Even now, while this runs its course, they're planning for the next one. OTOH, bureaucrats tend to prepare to fight for the last war while the foe plans something entirely original and different -- or at least something out of the ken of the intel people making the preparations.
Historically, France seems to have only two options in dealing with crisis: handwringing helplessness/surrender or guillotine time.
Another complicating factor: propaganda value for the enemy. If the methods France uses to put down the rioting are sufficiently brutal, then the entire region will become an even better recruiting zone for groups like Al-Qaeda. Thus, they could end up trading rioting for terrorism.
Then again, I have a sneaking suspicion France is going to end up going with the worst of both worlds: brutal suppression and concession granting. Particularly, the deal with Chirac foisting off responsibility to local officials does not build in my confidence. . .
I think that there is a natural type of attrition not just with perpetrators, but with easy targets. I would think that after two weeks of rioting, there are no cars or schools or other buildings left unburnt, except those off limits to the rioters. What do they do when they have no targets left? They can either move on to a new district (far from their own apartment/hiding places) or they can stop burning things. I think that that is probably the French strategy: contain the rioting (i.e. overwhelming police presence in the nicer areas of the country) and let it burn itself out.
As long as we're looking at this as a military matter, then people who just get tired of rioting and stay home should be considered deserters. Are deserters counted as casualties? If the riots were an organized military engagement, they would be prevented from quitting (deserting), but they're not. So, count any demoralization/intimidation tactics by the police, as well as sheer boredom, as contributing toward desertion and the reduction of the rioters' force.
Just a note that the French authorities in this conflict are not facing an opponent with a significant artillery train. If the rioters are able to obtain a more significant arsenal than a few crates of molotov cocktails, things might go differently. It should probably be mentioned that the rioters also do not have the benefit of forty years of planning by the German General Staff Corps.
Finally, the purpose of the Maginot Line was not to stop the German Army, but to force it to go elsewhere. The Maginot Line was absolutely effective in accomplishing its mission in the one war it was tested.
The French have a lot to be abused for without being historically inaccurate. The management of the Panama Canal attempt springs to mind, as does their current political class. There is no reason to deride them inaccurately on the basis of their military failures.
Well, a quick Dogpiling turned up:
http://www.brainydictionary.com/words/ca/casualty141773.html,
which lists desertion under causes of casualties.
Steven is certainly correct in saying that there is an attrition problem if the rioters want to sustain the intensity.
Another aspect is that I've never met a rioter yet who wasn't motivated by a conviction that burning other people'e property was a real fun time, while jail is just boring. Prior to Chrac declaring the State of Emergency, the police had to have cause before they arrested anyone. This meant that nascent rioters could move around and pick the time to strike when the risk of arrest was low. Now they're getting arrested as soon as they try to move through a checkpoint for violating the curfew. Oh well, maybe there's an American action film of French TV tonight.
I think the checkpoints are the most significant reason why the violenec is abating, but not every town has set a curfew. One thing to consider is that there are less cars on the street to burn.
The news reported last Friday (I think) that more than 900 cars were torched in just that one night. It wouldn't surprise me if 10,000 cars have been destroyed. Anyone who could secure the family sedan in a garage has probably already done so. I wish I owned a warehouse in Paris right now because I'd hire a dozen security guards and charge real money if anyone wanted to park there.
James
That's an unfamiliar take, to me, on the Maginot line. It's a shame it didn't work out, what with the whole elsewhere thing.
IIRC, the Maginot Line was supposed to stretch across their entire border. For whatever reason, they decided against extending it across the Belgian border, though.
For reasons that in retrospect elude comprehension, the Belgians wouldn't build their portion. At the time they probably did not want to pay for it and chose to cover for that by insisting that such a building project would be "provocative".
Thus proving the maxim that the only thing more expensive than defense spending, is defeat.
...Israel and the Palestinians.
Both governments are dealing with unrest amongst a enclave of culturally different people in their territory who cannot/will not/aren't allowed to assimilate.
The primary use of the people in these enclaves has been as a supplementary labor force in their host country. The demanmd for people from those enclaves has dropped greratly in recent years.
Both enclaves, in a day-to-day sense, manage themsleves.
I think we are seeing how Europe (or at least France) would like the Israelis to behave.
I don't want to push this too far. There are differences between France and its muslims and Israel and its. Nor do I think that Israel/Palestine is the central driving focus framing France's response.
But if the French (soon perhaps Europe) send in the military and bust heads, what does that do to the soft-pedal approach they're trying to force on Israel?
I have read some first hand German accounts that stated clearly that the line was breached within hours by normal infantry assault assisted by direct fire artillery and some air support. In light of this one would have to conclude the line of fortifications was completely worthless.
The line wasn't breached until it was flanked by German forces which moved through Belgium. My source for that is the "West Point Atlas of American Wars". (Best $70 I ever spent in a used bookstore.)
There was never, AFAIK, a plan for the Belgians to build a line integrated with the Maginot. The French war plan was to head north into Belgium at the beginning of the war and crush the Germans there, with their right flank protected by the Maginot Line. This went wrong because: 1) the Germans rapidly cracked the Belgian static defenses. A key point, Fort Eben Emael, was taken by a technologically novel gliderborne assault equipped with shaped charges, which let the paratroopers rapidly cripple the guns and punch open the armored cupolas of the fort. 2) The unexpected thrust through the Ardenees which pushed through the "pivot" on which the French advance into Belgium was rotating.
The Maginot line was a failure. Go ahead, point out that the Germans didn't breach it. You can to equal effect suggest that the Germans were cheating. The only success of the Maginot line could have been to force the Germans to attack France in another method equally as difficult, in which case the Germans may as well have attacked the Maginot line. Since the Germans didn't even try to attack the Maginot line except from inside France, it's clear to me that the Germans thought that the Maginot line was in fact overbuilt and that a different line of attack would be more fruitful.
The point behind a lock on your front door is to send criminals elsewhere. If the place you've sent them to is your own unlocked back door, then the lock on your FRONT door has failed because you spend too much money on it.
-russ
p.s. can you tell that I'm an economist? Don't even THINK of arguing with me, because an economist is never wrong.

Attrition didn't work too well for them in the 20th century, but they had different opposition.
Then again, they don't really have home field advantage this time, not that it helped at all last go round.
The Maginot line remains useless, continuing to vindicate Patton - "Fixed fortifications are monuments to the stupidity of man"