A Quick Fisking of Michael Smith

By smagar Posted in Comments (4) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

I've not been paying too much attention to the "Downing Street Memos" flap.  But, then I saw this story by Michael Smith, the British reporter who presumably "broke" the Downing Street memos.

In this article, Smith claims that the media is focusing on the wrong item in the Downing Street Stack of Stuff.  

American media coverage of the Downing Street memo has largely focused on the assertion by Sir Richard Dearlove, head of British foreign intelligence, that war was seen as inevitable in Washington, where "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."

But, asserts Smith, that's not the smoking gun.  This is.

I did not then regard the now-infamous memo -- the one that includes the minutes of the July 23 meeting -- as the most important. My main article focused on the separate briefing paper for those taking part, prepared beforehand by Cabinet Office experts.

It said that Blair agreed at Crawford that "the UK would support military action to bring about regime change." Because this was illegal, the officials noted, it was "necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally support military action."

But Downing Street had a "clever" plan that it hoped would trap Hussein into giving the allies the excuse they needed to go to war. It would persuade the U.N. Security Council to give the Iraqi leader an ultimatum to let in the weapons inspectors.

...

British officials hoped the ultimatum could be framed in words that would be so unacceptable to Hussein that he would reject it outright. But they were far from certain this would work, so there was also a Plan B.

...

[The Downing Street Stack of Stuff] quotes British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon as saying that "the U.S. had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime." This we now realize was Plan B. The editing at the beginning of this paragraph is--SURPRISE--mine!  I must admit that I can't determine from Smith's article precisely which of the D.S.M. documents he received contained Hoon's assertion above.

Put simply, U.S. aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone were dropping a lot more bombs in the hope of provoking a reaction that would give the allies an excuse to carry out a full-scale bombing campaign, an air war, the first stage of the conflict.

...

In other words, Bush and Blair began their war not in March 2003, as everyone believed, but at the end of August 2002, six weeks before Congress approved military action against Iraq.

The way in which the intelligence was "fixed" to justify war is old news.

The real news is the shady April 2002 deal to go to war, the cynical use of the U.N. to provide an excuse, and the secret, illegal air war without the backing of Congress.

I.e., Blair and Bush were trying to goad Hussein into war.  Ergo, they did not approach the UN pre-war negotiating process in good faith.  THIS is their "crime", as Smith sees it.

I'm sure y'all will discuss it in more detail later, but allow me to make my observations.

There IS another explanation for why US and UK bombing campaigns increased in the latter half of 2002.  Mr. Smith, did you consider this might have been a "show of force", intended to goad Hussein into submitting to coalition demands?  Everyone knew that UN consideration of the impending war was inevitable.  The UN was going to get the chance to play "good cop".  Deliberations and resolutions were inevitable.  Is it possible, Mr. Smith, that Blair and Bush were trying to play "bad cop"?  I mean, how effective can "good cop" be if there's no "bad cop" in the room?  Why would the defendant (Hussein, in this case) agree to what good cop wants, if the defendant has nothing to fear?

And, what if Blair and Bush were trying to goad Hussein into putting a noose around his neck?  Do you consider that, perhaps, Bush and Blair had determined that Hussein needed to go, once and for all?  Perhaps they had good reason to believe that this leopard was not going to change his spots, and wasn't going to stop menacing the neighborhood.  THEN, maybe Blair and Bush looked around, saw the irresoluteness of the UN, saw the military weakness and political spinelessness of the other major nations on Earth (the nations of "Old Europe", for instance), and determined that, if someone is going to have to fight Hussein--that someone is US!  Best fight him now, as opposed to fighting him a few years from now, after UN sanctions have collapsed and he's had a chance to upgun.

And, ref. Mr. Smith's assertion that Blair and Bush were going to force a UN resolution so toughly worded that he'd be compelled to say no, thus giving Blair and Bush the causus belli they wanted?  As I recall, the UN eventually demanded that Hussein comply fully with the inspections necessary to ensure he'd complied with the UN restrictions placed on him as a condition of ending the Gulf War.

Mr. Smith, Saddam Hussein was ON PAROLE!!  He'd done a series of bad things--invade Kuwait, fire missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel (two nations that had NOT attacked him) and polluting the air and seas of the Middle East with deliberate oil spills and fires--that led his fellow nation states to want assurances that he wouldn't do it again.  So, in response to the UN essentially agreeing not to urge his total removal from power in 1991, they placed Hussein on probation.  As anyone who watches "Dog, the Bounty Hunter" knows, you get little or no leeway in negotiating the conditions of your probation.  And, there are consequences if you violate probation.

Mr. Smith refers to the "shady" deal in April 2002 to go to war.  What's "shady" about it?  Has Mr. Smith heard of "backwards planning"?  If Blair and Bush had determined that, when all was said and done, Hussein would probably prefer war to "capitulation" to the UN, wouldn't it have been smart to determine, well in advance, exactly how far the US and UK was willing to press the issue?  Why start a process that would likely result in war, if you're not ready to fight that war in the first place?  And, seeing as the US and UK had to be ready at least to (1) give the UN route one last try and (2) play "bad cop" so that the UN's resolutions would have some teeth in them, you had to start the ball rolling months before the tanks themselves would first roll. If you wanted to give diplomacy one last chance, the UN route would have taken months to travel and exhaust.  If you wanted to fight when the desert weather was good for warfare--i.e., the cooler winter months--then you had to be done with diplomacy by then.

April 2002, therefore, was not too early for the US and UK to determine that, if necessary, they were willing to go all the way. Otherwise, why start this ball rolling in the first place?  In this article, I saw no real evidence that Bush and Blair were unwilling to go along with any meaningful alternative to war, such as Saddam's agreement to leave power.  Insinuations, yes.  Hints and winks, yes.  Evidence, no.  

I'll concede that Blair and Bush had likely concluded that the only real option for security in/around Iraq meant that Hussein had to go. If getting rid of him meant you needed to be ready to fight if circumstances demanded it, seems prudent to me to make that determination and resolution at the very beginning, before you start the whole process in the first place.  Mr. Smith apparently sees treachery in this; I see common sense.

Smith also claims the enhanced bombing campaign of fall 2002 was an "illegal" war.  In what sense did the bombing exceed the US and UK's authority to police the UN no-fly zones?  Maybe it technically did, but Smith gives no evidence. I'd like to hear him explain how an increase in US and UK strikes into the UN-APPROVED no-fly zones was per se an international crime.  After all, the US and UK had been fighting Hussein in these areas for a decade. This charge of "illegality" sounds like a strawman to me.  

In summary, there are alternative explanations for the actions and decisions Smith describes in this "smoking gun" of an article.  Personally, I'm glad to have the detailed allegations coming out in the open.  It will be interested to see the allegators (is that a word?) defend their charges, in full, one by one.

Let the games begin!

The problem with the quotation marks in my title?  (I must have done something wrong!)  Editors, feel free to remove the quotation marks if need be.

Thanks.  :)

Done by Thomas

Couldn't save the quotes and not have it show up funny in the Diaries section. Sorry about that.

Thanks, Thomas by smagar

Appreciate you're cleaning up my formatting error.

Air war... by earnric

There's only one problem with your comment:



And, what if Blair and Bush were trying to goad Hussein into putting a noose around his neck?  Do you consider that, perhaps, Bush and Blair had determined that Hussein needed to go, once and for all?  Perhaps they had good reason to believe that this leopard was not going to change his spots, and wasn't going to stop menacing the neighborhood.  THEN, maybe Blair and Bush looked around, saw the irresoluteness of the UN, saw the military weakness and political spinelessness of the other major nations on Earth ...

No one in the area felt threatened by Iraq/Hussein.

Let's listen to 4-star General and Former CENTCOM commander Anthony Zinni:



No one in the region felt threatened by Saddam.  No one in the region denied us our ability to conduct sanctions.  Many countries joined us in sanctions enforcement, in the no-fly zones, and in the maritime intercept operations where we attempted to intercept his oil and gas smuggling.

So to say containment didn't work, I think is not only wrong from the experiences we had then, but the proof is in the pudding, in what kind of military our troops faced when we went in there.  It disintegrated in front of us.  It didn't have the capabilities, that were pumped up, that were supposedly possessed by this military.  And I think that will be the first mistake that will be recorded in history, the belief that containment as a policy doesn't work.  

Read the analysis by the man who was in charge of executing our military policy in that part of the world immediately before Tommy Franks... and who Bush sent to the region (after the general retired) to TESTIFY as to what he thought about Iraq/Saddam.

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2208&from_page=../in
dex.cfm

R

 
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