Redstate

By AcademicElephant Posted in War — Comments (3) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

Global tensions have been ratcheted up yet another notch over the past few days by North Korea's announced intention to test a Taepodong 2 missile with the capacity to reach the west coast of the United States. Apparently miffed by all the attention being lavished on fellow axis-of-evil member Iran and former member Iraq, Kim Jung Il is doing some serious saber rattling, and he has certainly gotten Washington's attention. The idea of North Korea in possession of the military technology to strike not Seoul, not Tokyo, not Sydney, but Los Angeles is a profoundly sobering one, especially given North Korea's unsavory combination of a nuclear arsenal and an unstable dictator. While some suggest that North Korea is only threatening the test to further its diplomatic agenda--North Korea wants bi-lateral talks with the US, while the US insists on multi-lateral talks--few seem to be questioning the likelihood of North Korea having this technology. Which begs the question, what do we do if they test?

Read on...

It seems to me that most rational people would respond that if the North Koreans send that missile up over a close ally (Japan) and it gets within range, we should attempt to destroy it using our National Missile Defense system. There are those who have suggested that the North Koreans not be allowed to even fire the weapon, and that we should bomb the missile site before they get to the launching pad because the information they would get from the launch itself would allow them to embark on a huge missile development program, even if this first one was shot down. Perhaps not surprisingly, this argument is being put forth by those who both did their best to scuttle missile defense in the 1990s and whose resolute inaction in the face of North Korea's aggression fermented the crisis we face now. As a wise man said this morning, "Bombing NK is one of the most profoundly stupid and disturbed things that any former SecDef has ever come up with" (for more on this, go here). And it ignores another important piece of information that the North Koreans would take away from such an exchange: the US missile defense system is fully functional, and can negate the type of weapons they are developing--thus making their expensive and difficult development somewhat less attractive.

That's what I call effective deterrence--an aggressive defense.

This might be an opportune moment to review how our missile defense system arrived at its current incarnation, and to consider what having this system means to our predicament with North Korea.

The notion of modern missile defense was proposed by Ronald Reagan in the form of the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, which was designed to counter advances in Soviet missile technology:

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of the century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it's reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of efforts on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is.

I know it's sentimental, but just reading those words in our current crisis makes me feel re-assured that Mr. Reagan's strength of vision and resolve continue to protect us almost two decades after he left office.

SDI has been, of course, widely reviled. Nick-named "Star Wars," the program was considered too expensive and too provocative. It would never work anyway. Hindsight historians like General Wesley Clark have opined that the Cold War was won despite, rather than because of, such initiatives. But undeterred by such carping, Mr. Reagan and his stalwart Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, carried on and, consequently, the center of missile defense activities at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California is most appropriately named the Ronald W. Reagan Missile Defense Site.

Following President Reagan's initiative, the specific threats a missile defense system would deter shifted, but the need for such a program remained constant. In 1992, then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney argued that even while we were restructuring the military in the post-Cold War era (a period we may well call in hindsight the lead-up to the Global War on Terror), continuing to develop a ballistic missile defense system was "one of our most important and urgent military requirements." During the Clinton administration, the fate of the missile defense system was uncertain. To give them their due, Mr. Clinton and his successive Secretaries of Defense believed they had the North Korean problem under control through diplomacy, and the expensive and uncertain missile defense system seemed an appropriate place to cut back on military expenditure:

Aspin, Perry's predecessor, had declared an end to the Strategic Defense Initiative program, but long-standing supporters both inside and outside of Congress called for its resurrection, especially when the Defense budget came up. Perry rejected calls for revival of SDI, arguing that the money would be better spent on battle-field antimissile defenses and force modernization, that the United States at the moment did not face a real threat, and that if the system were built and deployed it would endanger the strategic arms limitation treaties with the Russians. The secretary was willing to continue funding development work on a national system, so that if a need emerged the United States could build and deploy it in three years. President Clinton signed the FY 1996 Defense bill early in 1996 only after Congress agreed to delete funding for a national missile defense system.

Mr. Clinton's final statement on the matter speaks for itself:

President Clinton has announced he is leaving a decision on whether the United States will deploy a missile defense system to his successor. The proposed system -- aimed against missiles fired by countries like Iraq or North Korea -- enjoys strong Republican support but is opposed by Russia and some U-S allies. Mr. Clinton is not killing the national missile defense, or N-M-D, program altogether. Flight testing and other development efforts will continue. But there will be no ground-breaking on the proposed radar complex in the Aleutian Islands off Alaska that is essential to early deployment.

In my opinion, we were deeply fortunate that another (then former) Secretary of Defense continued to take an interest in NMD during the later years of Mr. Clinton's second term. Donald Rumsfeld emerged as its greatest champion and one of the few voices that questioned the diplomatic containment of North Korea, most notably in the 1998 report by the bi-partisan Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat, which he chaired. In the 2000 election, then Vice President Al Gore promoted Mr. Clinton's limited support for NMD, which would not upset the diplomatic apple cart, while Texas Governor and then President George W. Bush pushed for a more robust and comprehensive program with the support of his new Secretary of Defense, as Mr. Bush outlined in a May, 2001 speech:

Several months ago, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to examine all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and our allies. The Secretary has explored a number of complementary and innovative approaches.

The Secretary has identified near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats. In some cases, we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the atmosphere. We also recognize the substantial advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost phase. The preliminary work has produced some promising options for advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this capability. If based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could provide limited, but effective, defenses.

Both Mr. Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld have been unflagging in their determination to expand and implement the NMD system. They have also been realistic about where we stand in its development. As its detractors love to point out, the technology is far from flawless. It's not a silver bullet. But is that a reason to abandon it?

Certainly not.

I don't know if our missile defense system will work when and if North Korea launches that missile towards the west, and while there are those who could make a much-better educated guess, I don't think anyone really knows for sure. Even given the support the program has received for the last five years, it still has a very limited capacity. But at the very least, we have a shot at it. We have a system in place that could be switched from "test" to "operational" mode earlier this week. It has taken us 20 years to get to this point; imagine the position we would be in if we hadn't even started yet, or if we had continued Mr. Clinton's policy of postponing this program and embraced Mr. Gore's projected plan to reduce it still further. It's not an attractive prospect.

Earlier today, Fred Kaplan lauded Senator John Kerry for his original vote against funding SDI, arguing that the program "deserved to be cut." Did Mr. Kaplan read the headlines this morning? Is he quite sure that attempting to smother the fledgling missile defense program in its crib, which would have drastically reduced our options in our current crisis, should now be a point of pride for Mr. Kerry? Perhaps Mr. Kaplan is sanguine that the Chinese can talk the North Koreans out of this test, and that therefore NMD is irrelevant. But how secure does that defense make you feel? Maybe the Chinese won't be able to next time. Maybe they won't want to. Maybe NMD might look a little less expendable.

And then those who mocked Mr. Reagan and Mr. Weinberger and accuse Mssrs. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld of being war mongers while celebrating Clinton foreign policy achievements and nursing their shattered dreams of Gore and Kerry presidencies might have an opportunity to say two simple words to the targets of their venom:

Thank you.