While all attention was focused on the Democrats’ impeachment star chamber in the House Intel Committee this week, we learned that a new DoJ OIG report was released. The title is, “Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Management of its Confidential Human Source Validation Processes.” Let’s look at what at what portions of the report say. I’ve also spliced some comments from intrepid independent researcher “Harold Finch” in brackets in this article to spice it up a bit:
From the Executive Summary:
Objectives: The objectives of this audit were to (1) evaluate the FBI’s Confidential Human Source (CHS) program policies and procedures, including its validation procedures; (2) assess the FBI’s policies and procedures for the use of non-attributable communications between agents and CHSs; and (3) examine the FBI’s ability to identify and fill gaps in the alignment of its CHSs with the nation’s highest priority threats and intelligence needs.
Results in Brief
We found that the FBI’s vetting process for CHSs, known as validation, did not comply with the Attorney General Guidelines. We also found deficiencies in the FBI’s long-term CHS validation reports which are relied upon by FBI and DoJ officials in determining the continued use of a CHS. Further, the FBI inadequately staffed and trained personnel conducting long-term validations and lacked an automated process to monitor its long-term CHSs. The joint DoJ-FBI committee tasked with oversight of the FBI’s CHS program did not meet its composition requirements placing an undue burden on just a few members. The committee also had a backlog of CHSs awaiting continued use determinations, potentially allowing them to operate when they should not have. The FBI also missed an opportunity to identify its non-compliance with established CHS validation requirements because it did not follow its own directives for incorporating new procedures into policy. Further, we identified issues related to the FBI’s current validation process with characteristics the FBI considers significant and its lack of policy for communicating with CHSs. Lastly, a newly proposed system designed to align its CHS base with its highest priorities will rely on ingesting data from at least one FBI system with known data quality issues.
[Harold Finch: This speaks to extremely sloppy special agents, i.e., lack of thorough documentation and trying to hide evidence from discovery. Case in point if such agents are Strzok and Pientka with Flynn FD302 lies and forgery. This leads me to believe the dishonesty and gaming of the system is widespread and a core culture problem and affects every aspect of FBI business.]
FBI did not comply with the AG guidelines and faces ongoing challenges in overseeing long-term CHSs
[Key statement: …they did not ensure the full scope of a long-term CHS’s operations was reviewed and FBI validation personnel told us they were discouraged from documenting conclusions and recommendations.]
Human source review committee was not composed according to the requirements and faces an ongoing backlog